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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Adoption and implementation of health information technology (HIT) is widely viewed as essential to the transformation of healthcare, and a key to satisfying the diverse needs of stakeholders burdened by rising costs, inefficiency, preventable errors, and poor quality of care. With proper design, implementation, and use, HIT promises the ability to reduce medical errors and improve quality of care. Yet while the use of HIT presents many new opportunities to improve patient care and safety, it can also create new hazards and opportunities for error. HIT will fulfill its potential only if the risks associated with its use are identified and a coordinated effort is developed to mitigate those risks. Accordingly, there is a need for measures to help identify the nature, scope, and prevalence of HIT-related safety issues and to assess how well providers, vendors, and others are preventing and/or mitigating HIT-related safety concerns.

In order to address the rapidly evolving area of HIT and its intersection with quality and outcomes, NQF initiated a project to develop a set of recommendations around the measurement of HIT-related safety issues. A multistakeholder committee (the HIT Safety Committee) was convened to provide input and direction on the development of a conceptual framework for analyzing measures of safety in health IT and to identify priority measurement areas with the greatest potential for both improving the safety of HIT and using HIT to improve patient safety.

The Committee adopted a three-domain framework for categorizing and conceptualizing potential measurement concepts and gaps in the area of HIT safety, and to provide a framework for recommendations around future HIT safety measure development. The goals of the framework are to ensure (1) that clinicians and patients have a foundation of safe HIT; (2) that HIT is properly integrated and used within healthcare organizations to deliver safe care; and (3) that HIT is part of continuous improvement processes to make care safer and more effective.

In addition, the Committee identified nine key measurement areas for HIT safety, each of which includes several measure concepts that could potentially reflect performance in that area, possible data sources or data collection strategies for each measurement topic, as well as the entities that could potentially be held accountable for performance in each area. The final list of key measurement areas is as follows:

1. Clinical Decision Support
2. System Interoperability
3. Patient Identification
4. User-Centered Design and Use of Testing, Evaluation, and Simulation to Promote Safety across the HIT Lifecycle
5. System Downtime (Data Availability)
6. Feedback and Information-Sharing
7. Use of HIT to Facilitate Timely and High-Quality Documentation
8. Patient Engagement
9. HIT-Focused Risk-Management Infrastructure

Additional details on each measurement area are available in the report.
The goal of this project is to provide high-level guidance and direction on priorities related to measurement of HIT safety. The potential measurement concepts identified in this report are suggested areas for further work and development by the HIT community and should not be considered NQF-endorsed measures, nor should they be taken as fully developed measures to be implemented as presented. The Committee intends the conceptual framework and measurement concepts presented in this report to serve as the groundwork for future efforts by measure developers, researchers, and others in the healthcare community as they advance measurement and quality improvement efforts around HIT safety. By identifying some of the highest-priority areas, this report may serve as a basis for future efforts to develop measures that can be incorporated throughout the HIT lifecycle as part of an iterative development process. Measurement based on iterative and continuous learning will successfully inform future HIT quality and safety improvement efforts, including in emerging areas such as improving diagnosis.

Advancing the safety and safe use of HIT will require stakeholders to share responsibility and accountability for patient safety. This may require a substantial cultural shift for the many groups involved in the development and use of HIT systems. The Committee recognizes that there are many hurdles to effective measurement of HIT safety, including these potential cultural barriers, as well as collection of data, associated costs, and other practical limitations along with a rapidly evolving sociotechnical environment. Because HIT innovation is moving so fast, it will be vital to develop mechanisms to identify and measure new safety issues that arise from HIT. However, these challenges should not prevent the field from moving forward with meaningful efforts to measure and improve the safety of HIT; indeed, the changing landscape offers a significant opportunity to ensure that patient safety considerations are incorporated into all phases of the HIT lifecycle. The framework for HIT safety and the Committee’s recommendations will continue to evolve as evidence, practices, and technologies mature.
Adoption and implementation of health information technology (HIT) is widely viewed as essential to the transformation of healthcare, and a key to satisfying the diverse needs of stakeholders burdened by rising costs, inefficiency, preventable errors, and poor quality of care. With proper design, implementation, and use, HIT promises the ability to reduce medical errors and improve quality of care. When fully integrated, the goal of HIT is to facilitate substantial improvements in quality and safety. Potential benefits of HIT include:

- Reduction of patient harm from medication errors and facilitation of evidence-based care through capabilities such as clinical decision support (CDS). Clinical decision support can help guide clinicians in diagnosis and decisionmaking by providing access to information at the point of care, including evidence-based best practices, guidance for treatment or preventive care (e.g., immunizations and routine screening tests), and information on potential allergies and medication interactions.

- With seamless interoperability, patient records can be easily accessed from multiple locations, making crucial health information available when and where it is needed as patients move within and between healthcare organizations. For example, when patients present to the emergency department to providers who have no prior knowledge of their care, providers can deliver the most informed treatment through access to prior records through electronic health records (EHRs) or other data sources.

- HIT may be used to efficiently report, track, and aggregate patient data within and across organizations. This may allow providers to more readily track quality of care and manage systematic problems, such as hospital-acquired illnesses. In addition, disease outbreaks can be monitored, allowing for improved population health and identification of widespread threats to health, such as flu epidemics.

- Through the use of tools such as computerized provider order entry (CPOE), e-prescribing, and bar code medication administration, HIT can also help to reduce prescription and other errors resulting from the illegible handwriting frequently found in paper-based record-keeping and orders.

Because of HIT’s potential to yield substantial benefits in quality, safety, and efficiency of healthcare, the federal government has been engaged in a concerted effort to encourage and incentivize adoption of HIT. Since the creation of the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) in 2004, over $24 billion has been spent in economic incentives for eligible healthcare providers to adopt and meaningfully use certified EHR technology.

However, despite the considerable investment in HIT and its contribution to substantial improvements in care, the widespread, rapid adoption of HIT has led to the potential for unintended consequences. For instance, there is broad variation in how HIT has been implemented within and across healthcare settings, which has contributed to a lack of interoperability across many settings. In addition, user interfaces have sometimes proven to be unclear, confusing, cumbersome, or time-consuming for clinicians to use, leading to inadvertent mistakes in entry or retrieval of information, workarounds, and other opportunities for error. While the use of HIT presents many new opportunities to improve patient care and safety, the complex interactions between people, processes, culture, and technology can also create an environment where new hazards are introduced. HIT will fulfill
its potential only if the risks associated with its use are identified and a coordinated effort is developed to mitigate those risks, as envisioned by the ONC Patient Safety Action and Surveillance Plan. Accordingly, there is a need for measures to help identify the nature, scope, and prevalence of HIT-related safety issues and to assess how well providers, vendors, and others are preventing and/or mitigating HIT-related safety concerns.

In order to address the rapidly evolving area of HIT and its intersection with quality and outcomes, NQF initiated a project to develop a set of recommendations around the measurement of HIT-related safety issues. To accomplish this task, NQF:

1. conducted an environmental scan of relevant HIT measures and measure concepts;
2. convened a multistakeholder committee to guide and provide input on all phases of the project, as well as engage NQF members and public stakeholders at key points throughout the project;
3. developed a conceptual framework for HIT safety as a way to categorize measure concepts and gaps in measurement;
4. identified challenges to the measurement of HIT-related safety events and adoption of best practices to strengthen measurement efforts; and
5. identified and prioritized key measurement areas and potential measure concepts related to HIT safety.

The goal of this project is to provide high-level guidance and direction on priorities related to measurement of HIT safety. The potential measurement concepts identified in this report are suggested areas for further work and development by the HIT community and should not be considered NQF-endorsed measures, nor should they be taken as fully developed measures to be implemented as presented. The Committee intends the conceptual framework and measurement concepts presented in this report to serve as the groundwork for future efforts by measure developers, researchers, and others in the healthcare community as they advance measurement and quality improvement efforts around HIT safety.

**HIT SAFETY COMMITTEE**

Through a public call for nominations, NQF convened a multistakeholder committee (the HIT Safety Committee) with diverse representation. The Committee included experts in health information technology data systems, electronic health records (EHRs), and patient safety, providers across different settings, front-line clinicians, health plan representatives, and experts in patient safety issues related to the use of HIT.

NQF also involved federal government partners in a consultative role. The full HIT Safety Committee roster can be found in Appendix A.

The Committee provided input on all phases of the work (e.g., guidance on the environmental scan, framework development, and measure concept prioritization) through a series of in-person meetings and conference calls.
NQF first conducted an environmental scan to determine what is known from the existing literature about the effect of HIT on patient care and about measurement and prevention of HIT-related safety events. The following questions guided the search:

- What are the most effective ways to monitor for and identify HIT-related safety events?
- Why and under what circumstances do HIT-related safety events occur?
- What is the best/most useful way to categorize HIT-related safety events?
- What kinds of barriers or confounding factors limit our ability to accurately and comprehensively measure HIT-related safety events?
- What measures of HIT-related safety events currently exist?

The results of this scan were used as the foundation for a measure gap analysis, which provided a preliminary roadmap of the existing measurement landscape and areas where additional measure development may be needed. The HIT Safety Committee used this analysis during its in-person and web-based meetings to provide input and direction on the development of a conceptual framework for analyzing measures of safety in HIT and to identify priority measurement areas with the greatest potential for both improving the safety of HIT and using HIT to improve patient safety.

Methodology

The environmental scan was guided by key search terms and parameters informed by the Committee. NQF also consulted with the Committee and other stakeholders to identify additional key informants or sources from the public and private sectors to query about relevant performance measures and measure concepts. In addition, NQF engaged public audiences and its membership of over 400 organizations and individuals participating on related NQF projects (e.g., MAP members, the Common Formats Expert Panel, the Patient Safety Standing Committee, and other NQF standing committees, the Health Information Technology Advisory Committee, and other relevant groups) to assist in this effort. (For additional details on the search strategy and results, please see Appendix B, and see Appendix C for a list of key definitions.)

Impact of HIT on Safety – Review of the Evidence

The evidence regarding HIT’s impact on safety is mixed, as has been noted by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) Committee on Patient Safety and Health Information Technology and others examining the issue. The IOM Committee, commissioned by ONC to study and address issues related to HIT and patient safety, could not point to any systematic reviews or studies as representing the most definitive evidence of the impact of HIT on patient safety. However, among practicing clinicians, HIT safety is a major issue of great interest and importance, and many individual studies in specific settings have shown both care improvements and patient safety problems associated with HIT. NQF’s environmental scan resulted in similar findings. While many studies have suggested that elements of HIT can help improve patient safety—particularly medication safety—other studies have found no effect, or even deleterious effects in some instances. A summary of key findings from reviews of the evidence identified in our search can be found in Appendix D.

Limitations of the Evidence

While there are several studies demonstrating specific patient harms from HIT, systematic harm/
adverse effects often do not appear in the peer-reviewed literature, are poorly indexed in the medical databases, and can be difficult to identify, limiting the ability of researchers to assess the effects of HIT on patient safety comprehensively. In addition, studies of HIT’s impact on patient safety are often narrowly focused—i.e., addressing a particular aspect or function of HIT, such as ePrescribing or clinical decision support, or a particular process of care, such as identification of patients at high risk for adverse medication events.

The high degree of variability and uncertainty in the literature makes it hard to draw definitive conclusions about the impact of HIT on patient safety, particularly on HIT’s link to clinical harm. In addition, there is increasing recognition that the complex relationships between HIT systems, system designers and developers, HIT implementers and users, relevant policies (both internal and external) and regulations, and various other factors prevent many HIT-related safety issues from being ascribed to a single causative factor, further limiting the insights that can be drawn from studies with a relatively specific focus. Several of the reviews identified in our scan noted this challenge explicitly.

Defining, Identifying, and Classifying Potential Risks Associated with HIT

Despite the limitations of the published literature, researchers and users of HIT acknowledge that a variety of risks may be associated with the implementation and use of HIT, introducing new patient safety challenges into the healthcare system. An HIT-related safety event—sometimes called “e-iatrogenesis”—has been defined as “patient harm caused at least in part by the application of health information technology.” Sittig and Singh have described HIT-related error as occurring “anytime the HIT system is unavailable for use, malfunctions during use, is used incorrectly, or when HIT interacts with another system component incorrectly, resulting in data being lost or incorrectly entered, displayed, or transmitted.” Factors across the spectrum of design, implementation, and use of HIT systems contribute to safety hazards and conditions that may induce or facilitate errors.

HIT Design

Challenges related to the design of HIT may include hardware and software reliability; interface usability; system interoperability; and data integrity, accessibility, and confidentiality. While HIT can facilitate improved patient care, flaws or inadequacies in design can cause safety hazards such as inaccurate recording or reporting of patient information (e.g., allergies or medications); data loss or corruption; inefficient workflow leading to delays, frustration, and workarounds; confusing user interfaces leading to incorrect entry or interpretation of information; and inability to exchange important information between systems (“record fragmentation”).

HIT Implementation

Approaches to planning and managing the implementation of HIT systems can have a significant impact on patient safety. Organizations procuring and implementing a new HIT system...
must pay heed to a multitude of considerations, including determination of organization-specific needs and customization of the new hardware and/or software to meet the needs; integration of new HIT into existing HIT and clinical workflows or redesign of clinical workflows to accommodate new HIT; providing adequate staff education and training; adaptation to cultural changes associated with HIT use; ensuring adequate backup and security systems; and preparing for planned or unplanned system downtime. The potential implications of flawed implementation strategies include staff resistance and resulting suboptimal use or circumvention of safety features; inadequate functionality for clinical processes; disruption of workflow and reduced efficiency; and poor fit between new HIT and existing physical and technical infrastructures.\textsuperscript{25,26,27,28}

**HIT Use**

The complexity of the healthcare work environment, the high cognitive demands placed on clinicians, and inadequacies in design or implementation of HIT systems can all contribute to errors or misuse of HIT in practice settings. Potential safety issues related to use of HIT systems include alert fatigue (leading clinicians to ignore warnings and reminders); automation bias (i.e., following system orders even when they contradict the clinician’s training and other available information); inappropriate use of copy-and-paste functionality (risking creation and perpetuation of outdated, inaccurate, or redundant information); introduction of workarounds for features or tasks that are perceived to be inconvenient or inefficient; and errors in entry or interpretation of information due to misunderstanding or misuse of software features.\textsuperscript{29,30,31}

There is a high degree of overlap and interaction between these areas, and a wide, complex network of factors influencing the behavior and performance of people, systems, and organizations involved in the HIT enterprise. Detecting and preventing HIT-related safety events is challenging because these are often multifaceted events, involving not only potentially unsafe technological features of electronic health records, for example, but also user behaviors, organizational characteristics, and rules and regulations that guide most technology-focused activities. As a result, the extent to which health IT may have caused or contributed to medical errors is often unclear.\textsuperscript{32}

**Approaches to Assessing the Benefits and Safety of HIT**

To aid researchers, policymakers, and other stakeholders in comprehending the complex web of interactions involved in the design, implementation, and use of health information technology, a number of theories, conceptual frameworks, and methodologies have been developed or applied: Many of them address the interaction between people and HIT and specifically focus on the safety implications of this interaction (See Appendix E).

**Role of Human Factors in HIT Safety**

Human factors issues are increasingly viewed as the core of many of the benefits and problems with HIT. Human factors and ergonomics (HFE) is a discipline addressing the cognitive, physical, and organizational elements involved in systems and system design.\textsuperscript{33} HFE approaches have attracted growing interest in the field of patient safety, as safety events are frequently influenced by multiple factors: cognitive (e.g., cognitive overload, decision fatigue), physical (e.g., inadequate or poorly designed tools or work environments), and organizational (e.g., sociotechnical work system, work process, policy, hierarchical culture).

HFE acknowledges the cognitive, physical, and organizational limitations that influence human behavior and performance, and can thereby account for those limitations in system design.\textsuperscript{34} The incorporation of HIT into healthcare delivery
introduces both opportunities and threats from an HFE perspective. While automation, decision support, quicker access to information, and other potential benefits of HIT can help to avoid errors, the design, implementation, and use of HIT introduce yet more layers of complexity to an already-complex system as well as additional opportunities for error, including data accessibility or integrity issues and human-machine interface flaws.

**Sociotechnical Approaches to HIT Safety**

The concept of a sociotechnical system (macro-ergonomics) has proven especially useful for describing the various factors influencing the safety and safe use of HIT. Building on HFE principles and other systems theory, sociotechnical models recognize that work systems are embedded in broader organizational and social contexts, and focus on improving the interactions among the various factors involved in an enterprise (people, processes, technologies, organizational and social/physical environments) to optimize performance and meet needs across the system.\(^{35}\)

A number of researchers have used sociotechnical approaches to analyze the safety issues posed by HIT.\(^{36}\) Notably, Sittig and Singh have described an 8-dimensional sociotechnical model that further dissects the traditional domain of technology to identify specific HIT-related challenges and considerations.\(^{37}\)

Sittig and Singh's sociotechnical model comprises eight dimensions of HIT Safety (see Appendix F for a diagram of the model)\(^{38,39}\):

1. **Hardware and software:** The computing infrastructure required to run HIT applications
2. **Clinical content:** Data, information, and knowledge that is entered, displayed, or transmitted via HIT
3. **Human-computer interface:** Aspects of the HIT system that users can see, touch, or hear
4. **People:** The humans involved in the design, development, implementation, and use of HIT
5. **Workflow and communication:** The steps needed to ensure that patients receive the care they need at the time they need it
6. **Organizational policies and procedures:** Internal culture, structures, policies, and procedures that affect all aspects of HIT management and healthcare
7. **External rules, regulations, and pressures:** External forces that facilitate or place constraints on the design, development, implementation, use, and evaluation of HIT in the clinical setting
8. **System measurement and monitoring:** Evaluation of system availability, use, effectiveness, and unintended consequences of system use

Sittig and Singh stress that the complex interaction and interdependence of these domains prevent any one domain from being analyzed or addressed in isolation; the core purpose of the model is to understand the interactions and interdependencies between the domains. They also summarize real-world applications of the model, indicating that their research and experiences suggest that the 8-dimensional sociotechnical model can be useful for analyzing safety issues in all phases of HIT design, implementation, use, and evaluation.

Sittig and Singh have also proposed a three-phase approach for the development of EHR-specific patient safety goals (Sittig and Singh 2012), which formed the basis for ONC’s SAFER Guide for EHRs and subsequently formed the basis for the Health IT Safety (HITS) framework.\(^{40}\) The HITS framework proposes three domains of HIT safety:\(^{41,42,43,44}\):

- **Domain 1: Safe Health IT**
  - Addresses concerns unique to EHR technology, including data integrity, data confidentiality, data availability, and information transfer
• Domain 2: Using HIT Safely
  – Addresses concerns arising from failure to use EHRs appropriately (e.g., alert fatigue and override) and from unsafe changes in workflow triggered by HIT (e.g., ‘workarounds’)

• Domain 3: Using HIT to Improve Safety
  – Addresses efforts to optimize the use of EHRs to improve quality and safety and to proactively monitor and report on the safety and safe use of EHRs

The authors note that a focus on domain 1 concerns may be more appropriate for new or recent adopters of HIT, who will need to ensure the safety and integrity of the technologies being adopted, while organizations that are more experienced with HIT are likely to be in better position to work toward improvement in all three domains. The authors also postulate that the three domains of HIT safety could be used as a framework for measurement and benchmarking of HIT-related safety performance.

Recognizing the value of the eight-dimensional sociotechnical model and the added utility of the three-phase framework for EHR safety, which helps to account for the changes in infrastructure and capabilities that occur as organizations transition from initial adoption of HIT to more sophisticated uses of the systems, Sittig and Singh, as well as Meeks and colleagues, have proposed a combination of these two models.  

The authors suggest that the combined model facilitates analysis of HIT safety from a complex systems perspective—as organizations adopt and implement HIT systems, they evolve over time in terms of their ‘sociotechnical’ scale (i.e., quantitative size), function, and structure (e.g., interconnection of system elements). This evolution is mirrored in the three phases of EHR safety, and as organizations advance through those phases, the sociotechnical model can be used to identify, understand, and anticipate safety risks or opportunities unique to each stage of EHR use (See Appendix G for a diagram of the combined three-phase/sociotechnical model of HIT safety).

In another article, Sittig and colleagues lay out a categorization of types of HIT-related safety concerns, including patient safety events that reached the patient, near-misses, and unsafe conditions. The authors identify five main types of HIT-related safety concerns:

1. HIT fails during use or is otherwise not working as designed.
   – The safety concern is directly attributable to the HIT.

2. HIT is working as designed, but the design does not meet user needs or expectations (i.e., bad design).
   – HIT is a contributing factor to the safety concern.

3. HIT is well designed and working correctly, but was not configured, implemented, or used in a way anticipated or planned for by system designers and developers.
   – These events are related to use of HIT rather than HIT itself, and may be referred to as configuration errors, ‘workarounds’ or incorrect usage.

4. HIT is working as designed, and was configured and used correctly, but interacts with external systems (e.g., via hardware or software interfaces) so that data are lost or incorrectly transmitted or displayed.
   – These events are inevitable due to the interactive complexity of tightly coupled systems. They are often referred to as HIT system interface safety concerns.

5. Specific HIT safety features or functions were not implemented or not available.

The authors suggest that these categories could form the basis for a nationwide HIT-related patient safety surveillance system, potentially being incorporated into the AHRQ Common Formats for Patient Safety Reporting.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING HIT SAFETY

After consideration of the various frameworks identified through the environmental scan, the HIT Safety Committee determined that a variation on the three-domain model proposed by Sittig and Singh\textsuperscript{50} provided the best combination of simplicity and utility, and that it would be most helpful for framing the Committee’s thinking about measurement and evaluation of the safety and safe use of HIT.

The central organizing principle of the HIT quality and safety improvement framework chosen by the Committee (see Box 1) is that the clinician, the patient, and others on the healthcare team are using HIT to optimize care for patients, and that systems should be designed, implemented, and continually assessed both to ensure that HIT is being used as intended and to monitor safety. Continuous safety and quality improvement should be emphasized, with the goal of ensuring that the clinician has a foundation of safe HIT, that HIT is properly integrated and used within an organization to deliver safe care, and that HIT is part of continuous improvement processes to make care safer and more effective. The framework was adapted using some of the concepts from Sittig and Singh’s EHR-specific patient safety goals (ePSGs)\textsuperscript{51} and Health IT Safety Framework,\textsuperscript{52} and is aligned with the practices and principles discussed in the SAFER Guides for EHRs.\textsuperscript{53} The conceptual framework serves to categorize and conceptualize potential measurement concepts and gaps in the area of HIT safety, and to provide a framework for recommendations around future HIT safety measure development.

### BOX 1. HIT QUALITY AND SAFETY IMPROVEMENT FRAMEWORK

**Domain 1. Safe HIT: Addressing Safety Concerns Unique to Technology**

A. **Data Availability** – HIT is accessible and usable upon demand by all care team members, including clinicians, administrative staff, patients, family members, and other authorized individuals.

B. **Data Integrity** – HIT data or information is complete, accurate, and created appropriately, and has not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner.

C. **Data Security** – HIT data or information is secure, protected, and available or disclosed only to authorized persons or processes.

**Domain 2. Using HIT Safely: Ensuring the Safe Use of Technology and Avoiding Unintended Consequences**

A. **HIT System Usability** – HIT features and functionality are designed and implemented so that they can be used effectively, efficiently, and to the satisfaction of the intended users to minimize the potential for harm.

B. **Organizational Planning, Preparation, and Governance for HIT**

C. **Complete and Correct HIT Use** – HIT features and functionality are implemented and used as intended.

D. **Surveillance and Monitoring** – As part of ongoing quality assurance and performance improvement, mechanisms are in place to monitor, detect, and report on the safety and safe use of HIT.

**Domain 3. Improving Patient Safety: Using HIT to Make Care Safer**

A. **Use of HIT to Improve Patient Safety** – HIT is leveraged to reduce patient harm and improve safety.

B. **HIT Facilitates Safe and Effective Patient Engagement** – HIT enables and facilitates effective patient engagement to enhance safety.
Domain 1 of the framework addresses safe HIT, meaning that HIT is designed and implemented in a manner that optimizes patient safety and actively addresses known and potential safety issues that are inherent to HIT software or hardware. This domain includes the subdomains of data availability, data integrity, and data security.

Data availability refers to the ability of all care team members, including clinicians and patients or family members, to access information needed for patient care. Threats to data availability may include technical failure of a HIT system, causing system downtime, or failure of a system to properly communicate or receive information as designed and intended. Threats to data integrity may include data corruption, causing information to be lost, damaged, or altered; data integrity may also be compromised by unintended duplication of information, including patient records, creating opportunities for confusion and error. Threats to data security could include the release or disclosure of information to unauthorized parties due to loss, theft, or hacking of data.

Domain 2 of the framework addresses the safe use of HIT, which includes issues related to the implementation, configuration, use, and governance of HIT systems. This domain comprises the subdomains of HIT usability, organizational planning, preparation, and governance for HIT, complete and correct use of HIT, and surveillance and monitoring of HIT for safety concerns.

The subdomain of HIT usability includes the quality and characteristics of HIT user interfaces (e.g., screen displays should be clear, easy to use, accessible, and understandable), the HIT system’s capabilities (e.g., whether the system supports and enables critical tasks), and other issues. Usability may be affected by system design (a domain 1 concept), but also by the ways in which HIT hardware and software are implemented and configured by the healthcare organization, and how well HIT design and capabilities are aligned with clinical workflow. The Organizational Planning, Preparation, and Governance for HIT subdomain addresses the structures, processes, and procedures that healthcare organizations have established to ensure the safety and safe use of HIT, which may include HIT procurement, preparation for HIT installation and implementation, disaster and/or emergency planning, user training, and other activities. Complete and correct use of HIT addresses whether the features and functionalities of HIT, including clinical decision support and alerts, computerized provider order entry, and other elements of HIT are being implemented, configured, and used in a way that ensures patient safety at both the facility and the clinician (i.e., end user) level. Threats to complete and correct use of HIT include improper configuration of clinical alerts (potentially leading to ‘alert fatigue’), inappropriate response to alerts by clinicians, the presence of order sets for common tasks or conditions, use of free-text order entry when coded items are available, failure to use clinical decision support, and other issues. The Surveillance and Monitoring subdomain addresses the need for vendors and healthcare organizations to have effective mechanisms and processes in place to monitor for HIT-related safety issues, and to address and report any identified risks, hazards, or events.

Domain 3 of the framework focuses on the ways in which HIT can be used to improve the safety of patient care and to facilitate meaningful and effective patient engagement.

HIT has the potential to advance patient safety in various ways, including improvements in medication reconciliation, medication adherence,
care coordination, and risk identification. HIT can be used to help facilitate evidence-based best practices through well-designed clinical decision support, and can enable safer and more patient-centered care by providing clinicians with access to important data so that each decision is made with full knowledge of prior care and the patient’s wishes. HIT may also be used to predict and facilitate intervention for patients who are at risk for particular issues (e.g., readmissions or postoperative complications). Beyond improving clinician performance, HIT can also enable patients to become more engaged in their care through technologies such as patient portals, allowing patients to learn more about their care, facilitating shared decisionmaking, and providing a mechanism for patients to provide feedback and input on both their care and their medical records. As technology evolves, new and unforeseen functions of HIT may well emerge to help facilitate care, but also may introduce new patient safety issues that need to be addressed.

Because of the complex interactions between design, development, implementation, and use of HIT systems, multiple aspects of this framework will likely apply to any given HIT safety issue. This is appropriate, as HIT safety concerns are frequently multidimensional, and thus require multidimensional approaches. For example, issues related to HIT system usability will likely require both domain 1 solutions (i.e., improvements in hardware or software design) as well as domain 2 solutions (i.e., improvements in system configuration and workflow design).

Input from the AHRQ Common Formats Expert Panel

Established by the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, the Common Formats for Patient Safety Reporting is a program administered by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) to enable reporting of patient safety events, hazards, and near-misses in standardized formats and with confidentiality protections.

The Common Formats include the ability to report events that are related to HIT. To ensure that the HIT safety framework was consistent with the Common Formats and that all relevant considerations were being addressed, NQF facilitated review of a draft version of the framework by the Common Formats Expert Panel, which provides input to AHRQ on the Common Formats and makes recommendations for addressing public comments submitted on the Formats. The Expert Panel reviewed the chosen framework and provided feedback to the HIT Safety Committee for consideration.

Common Formats Expert Panel members noted that their activities complement the HIT Safety Committee work, and that the three-domain HIT quality and safety improvement framework was well-aligned with the forms available for reporting HIT-related safety events.

The Expert Panel also noted that patient safety events rarely present themselves in neatly bundled packages that fit precisely into a framework. In the case of HIT-related events, errors often result from a complex interaction between the human and the computer system, and many such events do not present as being HIT-related, initially. Rather, such errors typically manifest as medication errors, wrong site surgeries, or delays in treatment, as opposed to HIT-related errors, only being reclassified later as information emerges. Root cause investigation and analysis is often needed to understand fully an HIT-related event. However, many organizations do not have the expertise needed (e.g., informatics, human factors, ergonomics) to conduct these investigations properly.
Some Expert Panel members suggested that healthcare should move toward systems with capacity to synthesize data elements and be predictive (e.g., analyzing patterns of data to alert system users of potential concern). It was noted that the ability of HIT systems to actually predict or identify problems before they occur and present to clinicians is an area that has not received enough emphasis. During discussion of the Common Formats Expert Panel’s feedback, HIT Safety Committee members observed that automatic reporting of safety events from the EHR is probably a long way off, given the complexity of these events. However, use of EHRs as a way to detect events as they are happening so that humans could recognize them and analyze them is likely to be more feasible in the short term. Some Committee members expected that, over the next 10 years, we should expect to see the evolution of voluntary reporting systems that can heavily leverage data from the EHR, allowing people to validate information and then import the data into reporting systems. Committee members noted that much of the most effective and important learning in this area is taking place at a local level. The Committee noted that HIT safety measurement and reporting efforts will need to consider healthcare organizations’ existing internal risk management and event reporting systems, given that these are often electronic systems that have been in place for a long time, and there may be reluctance to change internal taxonomies for external reporting.

Common Formats Expert Panel members noted that patient identification errors (e.g., ensuring that the correct patient record is before the clinician) are an important concern and should be addressed through HIT safety measurement efforts.

The Expert Panel also recommended consideration of HIT system uses that could facilitate patient engagement; e.g., patient adherence to treatment plans to reduce returns to the emergency department, readmissions, and errors in taking medication. The Panel suggested that patient engagement should be an important focus of measurement.

The Expert Panel also noted that there is a cost associated with achieving higher levels of patient safety surveillance, measurement, and reporting, and that this will be an important consideration for implementation efforts.

AHRQ is currently considering updates and enhancements to the Common Formats, and suggested that the agency and the Expert Panel will reflect on how the HIT safety conceptual framework can inform those efforts. HIT Safety Committee members noted that future iterations of the Common Formats, as well as HIT safety efforts, should examine information technology related to telemedicine, which is quickly emerging as a common use of technology in healthcare and will need to be considered from a patient safety standpoint.
KEY AREAS OF MEASUREMENT FOR HIT SAFETY

Informed by the environmental scan and Common Formats Expert Panel input, the HIT Safety Committee engaged in a process of identifying and then prioritizing measure concepts over two in-person meetings in Washington, DC, several conference calls, and through a final vote to identify the highest-priority measurement areas.

The initial in-person meeting was held on February 18-19, 2015, and included a presentation of the environmental scan and a general discussion of issues in HIT safety, and how to translate these concepts into potential measures. The group discussed which conceptual frameworks would be most appropriate to help categorize measures; this would ultimately serve as an overarching framework for presenting the measure concepts for consideration and prioritization. The group engaged in a brainstorming exercise in which potential measure concepts were identified. This process yielded 114 measure concepts, which were then further processed by staff and combined where appropriate to yield a list of 108 measure concepts (included in Appendix H). These served as the basis for discussion and further prioritization at the second in-person meeting, which was held on September 16-17, 2015.

At the second meeting, Committee members were divided into four breakout groups, with each group assigned a subset of the HIT safety measure concept list. The overall goal for each group was to identify the five highest priority measure concepts from their assigned list. Each group first conducted a review of the assigned measures to determine if measure concepts could be eliminated or where concepts needed to be added. Each group then rated the remaining measure concepts on two domains: importance and feasibility. These criteria were chosen because of their relevance to prioritization of measure concepts for future development, and because these criteria could form the basis of an initial assessment without the need for detailed specifications.

Importance was rated on a scale of High, Moderate, and Low. When assessing the importance of a measure concept, the Committee was instructed to consider the degree of impact on patient safety (i.e., if a vendor, organization, or clinician had poor performance on this measure, how would that affect patient safety?), the evidence supporting the measure (i.e., what is the strength of evidence that this measure concept reflects real and meaningful concerns related to the safety and safe use of HIT systems?), and “actionability” (i.e., the likelihood that measuring this issue will drive changes in organizational or individual behavior).

Similarly, feasibility was rated on a scale of High, Moderate, and Low. When rating the feasibility of a measure concept, the Committee was instructed to consider the availability and ease of capturing data (i.e., is this concept something that can be defined and specified in such a way that it could be measured consistently and accurately across measured entities?), and the potential readiness of organizations to tackle the problem (i.e., would it be reasonable to expect organizations or individuals to have the resources and capabilities necessary to address the issue in question?). Each breakout group used these criteria to inform their selection of five measure concepts to present to the full Committee for further consideration and discussion.

The full Committee then worked collectively to consolidate, refine, and modify the resulting measure concepts through discussion and real-time editing of the concepts under consideration. Through this process, the Committee identified 11
key measurement areas, each of which included several measure concepts that could potentially reflect performance in that area. The Committee also worked to identify possible data sources or data collection strategies for each measurement topic, as well as the entities that could potentially be held accountable for performance in each area.

After the in-person meeting, the Committee conducted a final vote on prioritization of the key measurement areas using an online survey instrument, ranking each measurement area against the criteria of importance (High/Moderate/Low) and feasibility (High/Moderate/Low). In addition, Committee members each voted for their top five measure concepts and provided additional feedback about measurement issues and challenges for each area. NQF staff reviewed this information along with write-in comments from the Committee and—based on these recommendations and Committee input—consolidated several of the measurement areas, resulting in a final list of nine key measurement areas. The final ranking of the measurement areas is based on the number of “top five” votes received for each area (i.e., clinical decision support received the highest number of ‘top five’ votes, system interoperability received the next-highest number of ‘top-five’ votes, and so on).

The final prioritized list of key measurement areas for HIT safety, in order from highest to lowest priority, is as follows:

1. Clinical Decision Support
2. System Interoperability
3. Patient Identification
4. User-Centered Design and Use of Testing, Evaluation, and Simulation to Promote Safety across the HIT Lifecycle
5. System Downtime (Data Availability)
6. Feedback and Information-Sharing
7. Use of HIT to Facilitate Timely and High-Quality Documentation
8. Patient Engagement
9. HIT-Focused Risk-Management Infrastructure

Details of the Committee’s discussion of each area are included below.

1. Clinical Decision Support (CDS)

CDS is one of the most promising functionalities of HIT, providing clinicians with tools to analyze patient data and guidance in making critical decisions at the point of care. However, clinical decision support that is poorly designed or configured improperly can disrupt care and has the potential to threaten patient safety. A well-documented safety concern related to CDS is “alert fatigue,” where clinicians receive such a high volume of alerts that they begin to ignore them, even though those alerts may be flagging possible safety risks. Information overload was also an issue mentioned by Committee members. It is important that CDS be designed and implemented in a way that makes it relevant and helpful without overwhelming clinicians with unnecessary alerts or excessive information. At the same time, it is also important for clinicians to use clinical decision support as intended and to respond to alerts and other CDS-generated information appropriately, so that the full potential of HIT to improve the safety and effectiveness of patient care may be realized.

The Committee agreed that measuring the quality of CDS is important to ensuring HIT safety. The Committee also agreed that measurement of CDS should address the appropriateness and timing of alerts, the appropriateness of clinicians’ responses to those alerts, and monitoring of CDS content to ensure that it remains useful, clinically relevant, up-to-date, and free of errors, particularly for high-risk situations. Committee members noted that a similar approach could be applied to order sets—i.e., measures could be developed around frequency with which organizations review and update critical order sets. The Committee pointed to the ONC’s SAFER Guides for EHRs, which include a set of recommended practices around the safe design, configuration, and use of...
CDS, as well as CDS-related safety indicators that could be further developed for the purposes of performance measurement.\textsuperscript{55} It was noted that the Leapfrog EHR ‘Flight Simulator’ could also be used as part of measurement of CDS safety and effectiveness. The Committee also expressed a strong interest in leveraging CDS to aid in scoring or assessing risk, potentially helping to predict high-risk events such as falls or hospital readmissions and to determine when and how to intervene. Committee members noted that these were still somewhat aspirational goals to look toward as the tools and the evidence evolve.

Accountability for ensuring appropriate functionality, design, implementation, and use of CDS systems should be shared across stakeholders. Data sources could include EHR data or metadata. Committee members noted that stage 2 of Meaningful Use includes requirements related to the implementation and use of CDS systems, and that this could provide a framework within which measurement could be implemented. In addition, Committee members also observed that alarm management is already an important priority for many organizations, increasing the feasibility of measurement in this area.

### MEASUREMENT RELATED TO CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT

**Potential Measure Concepts**

- % of alerts that occur at the right time, for the right person, in the right context, and are useful
- Instances of inappropriate alert overrides (# of patient allergic reactions/# of overrides that would be harmful – could have a simulation component)
- % of alerts for situations that do not warrant alerting
- Alert rate (as % of either total orders or of # of total patients)
- SAFER guide metrics on CDS; Leapfrog simulator results
- Monitoring of content for CDS based on new evidence or errors in CDS

**Accountable Entities**

Vendor; Facility; Clinician

**Potential Data Sources**

EHR; EHR metadata; SAFER Guide Assessments

**Primary Framework Domain**

2C: Complete/Correct HIT Use

**Other Applicable Framework Domains**

2A: HIT System Usability

2B: Organizational Planning, Preparation, & Governance for Health IT

3A: Use of HIT to improve Patient Safety

### COMMITTEE RATINGS

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<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Low</th>
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2. System Interoperability

Interoperability of HIT—defined as the ability of IT systems and software to communicate with each other through data exchange and to allow the use of exchanged information—is important to patient safety and quality of care. Complete information about a patient’s care enables more informed and cost-effective decisions about medical care, and reduces the likelihood of conflicting treatment plans. Healthcare is frequently delivered and managed across multiple providers and locations, and it is critical for patient medical histories and treatment records to be available to the right people at the right time. Ensuring information is available and shared between systems may significantly reduce the likelihood of communication-related problems in treatment decisions. While the use of HIT has improved information-sharing considerably, many EHRs are not interoperable within and across health systems, and problems can emerge from the interfaces between EHRs and other clinical systems, such as lab information systems. Recognizing the importance of interoperability to quality and safety, as well as the existence of significant gaps in interoperability, the Committee agreed that this would be a high-priority area for measure development.

With regard to measurement of interoperability, the Committee focused on availability of information for clinical decisionmaking. Committee members noted that failures in communication (e.g., failure of a provider to receive abnormal test results or allergy information) are among the leading causes of patient safety events, and that a lack of system interoperability can also lead to delays in treatment or wrong patient/wrong procedure problems. Measurement in this area could involve structural measures, possibly assessing whether systems have the ability to communicate and exchange specific types of data; interoperability could also be assessed using process measures, such as the number of times diagnostic test results are unavailable when needed. The Committee stated that if the availability of information were to be measured, there should be consideration of whether that information was expected to be available—if a system was not designed or configured to exchange certain data, it would be inappropriate to measure whether or not those data were available. The Committee also noted that both internal and external interoperability were important areas of measurement.

While Committee members agreed that interoperability is important to ensuring HIT safety and effectiveness, some also suggested that assessing interoperability may be a challenge, and that measurement in this area may yield information that has limited “actionability.” Improving interoperability depends not only on actions and interventions by organizations and IT vendors across diverse internal systems—challenging tasks in their own right—but also on a wide range of external factors, including the cooperation and performance of other healthcare providers, the existence of regional databases facilitating information exchange, and the legal, policy, and regulatory environment. However, Committee members stressed that interfaces can be improved, and that their ability to exchange information can be measured. Potential ways of collecting information on effective interoperability include surveys of users to assess how often the lack of interoperability was a barrier to medical care, assessment of help desk reports, and information provided by vendors. In addition, other measures could be developed that would gather data from providers or the EHR itself at the point of care. Some Committee members argued that measures should focus on known patient safety hazards (e.g., the lack of availability of prior stress test results in patients with chest pain).
Identifcation and Prioritization of Health IT Patient Safety Measures

MEASUREMENT RELATED TO SYSTEM INTEROPERABILITY

| Measure Concepts                                                                 | • Number of times diagnostic test results not available, transmitted, or displayed for the clinician or patient group as expected as a result of a problem at the interface between two different clinical HIT systems  
| • The extent to which meaningful external data is available to make diagnosis or management decisions (e.g., % of completed transactions between any two systems) |
| Accountable Entities          | Vendor; Facility; Other (e.g., Regional) |
| Possible Data Sources         | EHR; User surveys; Help desk reports |
| Primary Framework Domain      | 1A: Data Availability |
| Other Applicable Framework Domains | 2B: Organizational Planning & Preparation |

COMMITTEE RATINGS

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3. Patient Identification

Among the patient safety concerns that have emerged with increasing use of EHRs is the issue of accurate and reliable patient identification. Potential safety issues related to patient identification include the creation of duplicate patient records within an organization’s system, ‘overlay’ of a patient’s information into the wrong patient’s record, orders entered for the wrong patient, and care delivered to the wrong patient because of problems with identification. Wrong-patient errors have been identified as being among the most common human-computer interface issues. Patient identification errors are of particular concern in the context of EHRs, because wrong information entered into a system may spread across other systems and affect other encounters, having cascading effects and creating additional opportunities for error. Committee members noted that identifying the right patient is one of the most important components to patient safety, and that errors in this area have the potential to cause catastrophic events.

Because of the safety risks in this area, the Committee agreed that patient identification is an important area for measurement. NQF recently reviewed and endorsed a measure related to patient identification (NQF #2723: Wrong Patient Retract and Reorder [WP-RAR]) through its Consensus Development Process (CDP); this measure assesses the number of times an order was entered on the wrong patient, then retracted and reordered on another patient within a 10-minute period. These events can happen when physicians are entering orders and mistakenly order care for the wrong patient, and are generally considered to be HIT-related errors. In addition to this measure, the Committee discussed other potential measures around patient identification, including the proportion of duplicate patients within an EHR. Duplicate records can occur when several accounts are created for the same patient, which can confuse clinicians because important information may be missing from some of the accounts. Measurement in this area is supported by the American Health Information Management Association (AHIMA), and could include both facility-level and enterprise-level (i.e., across multiple healthcare organizations) rates of duplicate patient records.

The Committee suggested that accountability for patient identification could be shared across all stakeholders, including vendors, healthcare...
organizations, clinicians, and even patients. Each stakeholder can take an important role in ensuring that patients are accurately identified, duplicate records are merged, and systems are designed to detect and remediate patient identification problems. Committee members did caution that patient accountability would need to be framed and implemented carefully, with consideration that patients are often ill and vulnerable. The Committee generally agreed that measurement in this area is feasible, with some noting that tools related to patient selection and monitoring have improved dramatically. However, some Committee members questioned whether measurement of patient identification could be implemented consistently and accurately across institutions, and others suggested that even when identified, the causes of patient identification errors can be difficult to correct.

Measurement information could come from a variety of sources, including directly from EHR or from monitoring of administrative data. Some Committee members suggested that wrong-patient errors that affect the patient could be considered sentinel events.

### MEASUREMENT RELATED TO PATIENT IDENTIFICATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Measure Concepts</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Percentage of potential duplicate patients in EHR</td>
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<td>• Retract-and-reorder tool</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Use of barcode scanning in medication preparation and administration</td>
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<td>• % of incorrect patient ID alerts in barcode medication administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Record overlay (&gt;=2 different patients; info in the same record): # of chart corrections</td>
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<tr>
<td>• AHIMA Measures[6]:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Facility-level rate of duplicate patient records (for static database)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» (Total # of individual duplicate patient records * 100)/ (Total # of patient records in the MPI[6] database)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Facility-level rate of duplicate record creation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» (Total # of individual duplicate patient records for a given time period * 100)/(Total # of registrations, preregistration, or scheduling events for the same time period)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Enterprise-level overlap (across-facility duplicate) rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» (Total # of individual overlap[6] enterprise patient records * 100)/ (Total no. of unique patient records across two or more MPI databases [i.e., facilities])</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountable Entities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vendor; Facility; Clinician; Patient</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Data Sources</th>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Primary Framework Domain</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1B: Data Integrity</td>
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<tr>
<th>Other Applicable Framework Domains</th>
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<tr>
<td>2B: Organizational Planning, Preparation, &amp; Governance for HIT</td>
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<tr>
<td>2C: Complete/Correct HIT Use</td>
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<tr>
<td>2D: Surveillance and Monitoring of HIT</td>
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4. User-Centered Design and Use of Testing, Evaluation, and Simulation to Promote Safety Across the HIT Lifecycle

The importance of user-centered design was a major focus of the Committee’s discussion. Better-designed, more user-friendly systems could potentially reduce error rates and make care safer, and Committee members agreed that user-centered design is essential for safe and effective HIT. Both usability testing/evaluation and user-centered design are important to achieving these goals. Another key means of promoting safe design and use of HIT systems is through simulation. Using simulation, safety issues related to the overall design of the system and its local implementation (e.g., potential process breakdowns such as lack of alignment between design and workflow) may be detected not only during production and prior to implementation, but also during upgrades or periodic evaluations as part of an iterative development cycle.

The Committee discussed a range of potential measure concepts related to user-centered design. Committee members observed that existing standards for user-centered design could be used to develop and assess EHRs or the use of EHRs within healthcare organizations. In addition, there could be measures of whether and how end users, including patients, were involved in the lifecycle of HIT from design and development to implementation and use. There could also be surveys of usability that could be administered to users, which may include the concept of usability in the context of patient safety. Specifically, the degree to which the design of the system may make errors more or less likely to occur was an important concept.

Committee members acknowledged that usability issues—including burdensome data entry requirements—often lead to workarounds and incomplete or inaccurate data, and that they may be correlated with patient safety issues. The Committee expressed an interest in identifying potential measures that could assist in the identification of workarounds, their causes, and their risk to patient safety. Several examples were discussed by the Committee, including the length of time that passes between patient encounters and chart documentation, and the extent to which scribes and/or dictation systems are being used; the Committee thought these could be indicators of usability issues requiring workarounds.

ONC released a set of certification and meaningful use requirements for EHRs for stage 2 of Meaningful Use. These require that EHR vendors include evidence of user-centered design and user test results in their certification submission. To be able to obtain the ONC certification (and Meaningful Use funding) EHR vendors must follow a formal User-Centered Design process and perform summative usability testing on specific areas of the product. Given this existing framework, quality measurement could be incorporated as part of this process.

The Committee agreed that both user-centered simulation and organization/system-centered simulation could be important areas for measurement. Simulation creates needed awareness of potential safety risks or vulnerabilities in processes, workflows, and HIT systems, and creates opportunities to address those issues proactively. User-centered simulation—the use of simulation to test end users’ ability to use HIT safely and effectively—could be measured as the proportion of users who are tested on a simulator, such as the Leapfrog flight simulator. User competency scores on simulation testing could also be reported as a measure of quality. Organization- or system-centered simulation would focus on an organization or vendor’s use of simulation to inform design and implementation of HIT. Measurement might assess whether testing/simulation of systems is performed to identify potential HIT-related safety risks or problems, and whether it is performed across the HIT ‘lifecycle,’ from design and
development through implementation, use, and evaluation. In addition, the results of simulations themselves could be used to measure and evaluate the impact of systems on user workload, learning curve, and the degree to which workarounds were employed during a simulation.

Because simulation should be used in various ways across the HIT lifecycle, accountability could be applied to all parties involved in that lifecycle. Clinicians could be measured on their participation or performance during a simulation; healthcare organizations could be measured on whether and how they conduct simulations, or the performance of clinicians; vendors could be held accountable for the use of simulation during the development of HIT systems, as well as the method of simulation. Data on the use of simulation could be derived from attestations or directly from simulators (e.g., whether simulation was used, and what the results of the simulation were).

Accountability for usability and user-centered design should be shared between vendors, who are responsible for designing easy-to-use systems and ensuring involvement of end users in that process, and facilities, who are responsible for ensuring that systems are implemented and configured in a manner that makes them usable in a local context. Committee members noted that a standardized approach to usability is necessary for meaningful and comparable measurement, and guidelines recently released by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) should help in this area. Data on usability and user-centered design could be gathered from surveying users, surveying designers, from administrative documents, or through analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data gathered from usability evaluations and simulation data (e.g., performance success rate). Committee members also noted that simulation should be a collaborative effort between vendors and organizations. Organizations can conduct simulations, but without support from vendors, these efforts may not be as effective. The Committee thought that measures of usability and user-centered design would need to be coordinated with ONC and NIST.

The Committee noted that simulation-related measurement could include specific elements such as training, competency evaluation, usability evaluation, workflow analysis, and sociotechnical analysis at both the user and organizational levels. Some Committee members suggested that measures related to simulation should focus on specific high-risk scenarios; others cautioned that promoting the use of simulation might better be handled through accreditation or regulation rather than performance measurement. From a feasibility perspective, some noted that development of simulation and training programs is likely to require substantial financial and human resources, and may be more difficult for providers to implement than some of the other measure concepts under consideration. In addition, it may be challenging to measure the effectiveness and adequacy of simulations; some Committee members noted that human factors experts should be involved in order to derive the greatest benefit from these activities, but suggested that such expertise may be in limited supply.
### MEASUREMENT RELATED TO USER-CENTERED DESIGN AND USE OF TESTING/SIMULATION TO PROMOTE HIT SAFETY

| Potential Measure Concepts | • Use of existing standards for user-centered design  
|                           | • End user involvement in lifecycle (design, development, implementation, use, evaluation) of HIT (e.g., how participants are selected and how many are involved)  
|                           | • Whether and how testing has been conducted to assess usability  
|                           | • Usability evaluation that promotes patient safety  
|                           | • Assessments of EHR usability during all phases of the lifecycle for the purpose of increasing patient safety  
|                           | • Use (or inappropriate use) of scribes and dictation systems  
|                           | • User-centered simulation  
|                           |   - % of users that are tested in a simulator (e.g., Leapfrog flight simulator)  
|                           |   - User competency scores on simulation testing (overall scores and by test category)  
|                           |   - % of users that successfully complete a given task  
|                           |   - # or % of critical design issues solved before implementation  
|                           | • Organization/system-centered simulation  
|                           |   - Testing/simulation of systems are being used to identify potential HIT risks or problems is conducted across the lifecycle (design, development, implementation, use, evaluation)  
|                           |   - Workloads and workarounds in simulation  

| Accountable Entities | Vendor; Facility; Clinician  
| Potential Data Sources | Surveys; Administrative data; Attestations; Simulation data; Usability testing data  
| Primary Framework Domain | 2A: HIT System Usability  
| Other Applicable Framework Domains | 2B: Organizational Planning, Preparation, & Governance for HIT  
| 2C: Complete/Correct HIT Use  
| 2D: Surveillance and Monitoring of HIT  

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</table>
5. System Downtime

When EHR systems are implemented, clinical care processes become highly dependent on their effective functioning. If and when systems are unavailable for periods of time, this is referred to as “downtime.” Downtime can occur in a scheduled manner, where it is planned in advance and required to improve the functioning of the system (i.e., system patches or new software), but it can also occur unexpectedly due to data corruption, system failure, or other events, requiring rapid changes to clinical processes in real time and threatening patient safety. During episodes of downtime, providers may implement alternative systems (e.g., use of paper charts) for record keeping, patient billing, and clinical order entry, which can be highly disruptive to clinical care. Committee members stressed that functioning EHRs are “mission-critical,” underscoring the importance of downtime prevention and mitigation.

Committee members noted that downtime cannot be totally avoided, so it is important for organizations to have backup or redundant systems in place. Having multilevel, overlapping systems that work both together and in isolation to protect EHR data in instances of downtime can ensure that clinicians have access to needed information. In addition, healthcare organizations must be able to coordinate and support ongoing patient care processes seamlessly in the event of unexpected downtime. Comprehensive and effective disaster or emergency planning can help reduce the disruptive impact of downtime.

With regard to measurement of system downtime, the Committee contemplated measures around the frequency and length of unexpected downtime as well as organizational preparedness for inevitable downtime events. Committee members discussed the degree of specificity that should be applied to downtime measures (e.g., should downtime be measured only if it exceeds a certain amount of time?). The severity of a downtime event may be exacerbated by its scope (i.e., whether it is widespread or localized to a specific system), its duration, and its setting. For example, in the emergency department or operating room, downtime even for a short period can be very disruptive, while in other settings unexpected downtime could occur for longer periods with less disruption of clinical care. Accordingly, timeframes applied to downtime measures could be context-specific. Committee members agreed that regardless of its length of time, any downtime affecting clinical care should be captured in measurement.

The Committee also discussed measuring the number of times that downtime procedures are activated. If downtime occurs only for a short period and does not require downtime procedures (such as temporary transition to paper documentation), the Committee viewed it as less disruptive. Structural measures around downtime and organizational preparedness could include the presence of a disaster preparedness plan supporting patient care processes and billing during downtime, and the frequency of downtime drills or downtime risk assessments. Measures developed in this area should be consistent with applicable accreditation requirements. Committee members suggested that measurement around downtime preparation should include preparedness drills and potentially audits or inspections, such as those conducted by The Joint Commission, rather than simple attestation that appropriate polices are in place.

In general, the Committee agreed that measurement of system downtime is highly feasible and salient to HIT safety and quality; downtime events are usually detectable, although capture of information may be delayed in some instances. Data sources for downtime measurement could include the EHR itself, surveys, administrative records such as system logs, and audits or inspections. Committee members noted a recent study demonstrating the feasibility of measuring the effects of downtime on hospital pathology processes using EHR.
data. The Committee agreed that there should be shared accountability for downtime between the vendor and the facility, and that this could be an appropriate basis on which to compare the performance of institutions and vendors. Some Committee members observed that it can be expensive to maintain a high level of data protection and availability; with competition for available funds at healthcare organizations, this could be a potential barrier to performance.

### MEASUREMENT RELATED TO SYSTEM DOWNTIME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Measure Concepts</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Unexpected downtime affecting clinical care (timeframe may be context-specific)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Frequency and length of time</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Response time greater than mean of 15 seconds (as proxy for functional downtime)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• % system uptime or availability (ideally &gt;99.9%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• # of times that downtime procedures are activated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Availability of disaster preparedness plan supporting patient care processes and billing during downtime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Frequency of downtime drills (consistent with regulatory and accreditation requirements)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Frequency of downtime risk assessment (consistent with regulatory and accreditation requirements)</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountable Entities</th>
<th>Vendor; Facility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Potential Data Sources</td>
<td>EHR; surveys; administrative records; audits and/or inspections (e.g., by accreditation bodies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Framework Domain</td>
<td>1A: Data Availability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Applicable Framework Domains</td>
<td>1c: Data Security, 2B: Organizational Planning, Preparation, &amp; Governance for HIT</td>
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### COMMITTEE RATINGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Low</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feasibility</td>
<td>17</td>
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### 6. Feedback and Information-Sharing

EHRs can sometimes be subject to patient safety problems that are identified by an institution or by a vendor. Because EHRs are a rapidly evolving technology, it is vital to publicly share “lessons learned” and solutions about patient safety problems across the user community. Meaningful feedback and information-sharing among vendors, users, and healthcare organizations support and enhance the safety and safe use of HIT. This information-sharing should occur in a timely manner to permit institutions and clinicians to understand EHR patient safety problems that have occurred in other settings in order to prevent and mitigate similar errors. Committee members raised concern that some vendor contracts contain broad nondisclosure and confidentiality provisions as well as other intellectual property protections which prevent certain EHR software information, including screenshots and comparative user experiences, from being publicly shared. The Committee believed that such contract terms should not be broader than reasonably necessary to protect the vendor’s legitimate intellectual property interests when balanced against patient
safety concerns. Some members of the Committee suggested that such provisions directly conflict with the goal of sharing patient safety knowledge for quality improvement purposes across settings.

The Committee considered a number of approaches to measurement in this area. For example, measures could assess whether and when vendors send notifications to all relevant institutions following identification of software, hardware, or other issues that materially affect patient safety. Measures could also evaluate the effectiveness of vendor user groups in identifying and sharing patient safety concerns, or assess the extent to which user experiences and other information relevant to HIT design and implementation are being shared freely and transparently across both vendors and user communities.

While vendor accountability is important in this area, Committee members agreed that accountability should be shared between both vendors and healthcare organizations. It was noted that software license and hardware purchase agreements should support and facilitate information-sharing, and that both vendors and healthcare organizations bear some responsibility in this area. Measures could potentially be developed to hold both vendors and healthcare organizations accountable for crafting agreements that reflect the principle that the party who has the most control over the factors giving rise to a particular HIT patient safety risk is in the best position to prevent and mitigate that risk, and thus is the one charged with responsibility for preventing or mitigating such risk in the agreement.

Data supporting measurement of feedback and information-sharing could come from vendor contracts, surveys of users, analysis of helpdesk reports, or data from accreditation and certification bodies (ACBs). It was also noted that Patient Safety Organizations may serve as a “trusted space” for confidential reporting of HIT-related safety issues. Some Committee members thought that measurement in this area could be challenging, requiring a high level of commitment and cooperation, and an infrastructure that may be lacking at the moment. Confidentiality issues may also pose a barrier. Others suggested that feasibility is high in principle, and that vendors in particular should be engaging in these activities to ensure customer satisfaction, but noted that a shift in culture may be needed. A number of Committee members felt that in comparison to some other areas, this may be a lower priority for measurement.
MEASUREMENT RELATED TO FEEDBACK AND INFORMATION-SHARING

Potential Measure Concepts

- Timely vendor notifications are sent to all organizational users following identification of software, hardware, or other issues that materially affect patient safety
- Vendor provides solutions to identified patient safety risks and errors ASAP following event
- Vendors share comparative user experiences across organizational users
- Vendor user groups effectively identify and share patient safety concerns (could incorporate user feedback/survey information)
- Free and transparent bilateral exchange of information about real-time comparative user experiences and issues with HIT design and implementation
- Software license and hardware purchase agreements permit shared learning of comparative user experiences, timely vendor response to provider requests for information, and use of vendor product information in research studies for peer reviewed journals (e.g., screen shots) and promote shared accountability for HIT safety

Accountable Entities
Vendor; Facility

Potential Data Sources
Vendor contracts; surveys; data from ACBs (accreditation and certification bodies); help-desk reports

Primary Framework Domain
2D: Surveillance and Monitoring of HIT

Other Applicable Framework Domains
2B: Organizational Planning, Preparation, & Governance for HIT

COMMITTEE RATINGS

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<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
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<th>Moderate</th>
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<td>Importance</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feasibility</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>5</td>
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7. Use of HIT to Facilitate Timely and High-Quality Documentation

Timely documentation and communication of information during care transitions are vital to ensuring patient safety. This is true even in the absence of HIT, but the rapid implementation of EHRs has created both new opportunities and new challenges. Committee members noted that ONC has identified care transition as one of the primary areas in which the EHRs can improve the quality of care. Good clinical documentation can facilitate transitions in care and ensure that diagnoses, medication lists, allergies, and other critical information is captured and communicated appropriately as patients move across care settings. Timeliness is similarly important, particularly for transitions in care that are immediate (e.g., an emergency department patient being admitted to the hospital). Committee members agreed that HIT systems and associated workflows should facilitate the timely capture and transmission of high-quality clinical information, and that this would be an important focus for measurement efforts.

The Committee noted that some topics could feasibly be addressed in the short-term, including the timeliness of documentation and transmission of clinical data, the timeliness of follow-up on diagnostic results, the quality of discharge information, and the use of structured
or designated fields versus the use of free text for documentation of active problems (e.g., allergies, medications). This is an important issue for HIT safety because entry of information in free text fields rather than structured data fields may limit the extent to which that information can be exchanged and interpreted across systems.

The Committee also suggested that in the longer-term, measurement could help drive the use of HIT to facilitate medication reconciliation and adherence, for example through improved patient verification and use of patient portals or other technologies. Committee members noted that the HIT landscape is evolving rapidly, and that new opportunities for quality improvement and measurement in this area will likely emerge.

MEASUREMENT RELATED TO DOCUMENTATION QUALITY AND TIMELINESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Measure Concepts</th>
<th>Areas for immediate focus:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Timely clinical documentation and timely transmission of available clinical information at the transition of care (post-visit or time of referral)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Information available, sent, received, viewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- % of patients in the hospital who have at least one progress note per day written within an established time period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Timely follow-up on diagnostic tests (i.e., labs, imaging) as determined by manual or electronic audit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Follow-up may include: communication to patient, ordering necessary tests or documentation, or referral to other care providers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Time from result availability to outcome, (e.g., communication to patient or clinician follow-up, clinician response) could be measured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Discharge and transition note quality (i.e., Reason for referral) and completeness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- % or # of charts with allergies in free text versus in structured or designated fields</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Areas for future consideration:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Medication reconciliation performed, including patient verification either during the encounter or through technology (e.g., patient portals or HIE if available)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountable Entities</th>
<th>Facility; Clinician</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Potential Data Sources</td>
<td>EHR; Claims; Pharmacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Framework Domain</td>
<td>2C: Complete/Correct HIT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Applicable Framework Domains</td>
<td>2A: HIT System Usability</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3A: Use of HIT to improve Patient Safety</td>
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8. Patient Engagement

The Committee discussed patients’ increasing ability to engage in their own care through technology, and agreed that this was emerging as an important area for HIT safety. Committee members agreed that patient engagement is an important component of healthcare, noting that studies have shown that consumers who are engaged and vested in their healthcare plans tend to have more favorable health outcomes (especially when measured against the consumers’ health goals). Particularly with the promulgation of patient portals, the usability, usefulness, and use of these portals should be a focus of quality measurement.

The Committee’s discussion focused on the effectiveness of patient portals in facilitating patient engagement, and touched on concepts that could serve as indicators in this area, including the rates of patients who use their portals to acknowledge test results, suggest corrections to their records, or to view, edit, or annotate their records. Other measure concepts focused on the structural characteristics of patient portals, such as patients’ ability to view progress notes in their records, and the presence of mechanisms for patients to identify errors, omissions, or other potential safety concerns in their records. The Committee also suggested getting direct patient feedback on the usability and usefulness of portals through surveys; some raised the prospect of incorporating additional HIT-related questions into Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS) surveys.

Committee members cautioned that patient portals are still in a nascent phase; many patients are not yet used to interacting with healthcare in this way and will need to be educated and empowered by those within the healthcare system to ensure that measurement of their engagement is interpreted accurately. In order for performance results to bring about meaningful change, it will be critical to examine those results in detail to see why patients are or are not engaging in their care. In addition, there are disparities in both access and ability to interact with technology that will need to be considered for measurement in this area to be meaningful. Committee members also noted that with the evolution of technology and its use, the means by which patients engage with their healthcare providers will also evolve (e.g., use of text messages versus emails), and this will create challenges in establishing trend data over time. Other challenges to assessing the use and effectiveness of patient portals include the episodic nature of hospitalizations, and the potential use of multiple portals by patients.

Committee members agreed that multiple stakeholders should share accountability for the effective design, implementation, and use of patient portals.
## MEASUREMENT RELATED TO PATIENT ENGAGEMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Measure Concepts</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Survey-based measure of patients’ and providers’ experiences with patient safety and technology</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• % of patient acknowledgement of diagnostic test results via patient-facing technology</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• % of patients who suggest corrections to the EHR information</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• % Patients viewing and annotating and editing the medical record</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Can patients view the information?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Do they view the information?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Do they annotate (i.e., suggest corrections)?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ability to access and annotate the EHR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• % of patient portals that include viewable patient progress notes - Open Notes Initiative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Respond to patient electronic communication (e.g., telemedicine, portals) within 48 hours</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Do patient portals have mechanisms to identify errors, omissions, and other safety risks or problems and have corrections reflected in other clinical information systems? Includes HIT issues and other safety concerns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Structural measure: Is feature present?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>– Process measure: How often is feature used?</td>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Potential Data Sources</td>
<td>EHR; Claims; Pharmacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Framework Domain</td>
<td>3B: HIT Facilitates Safe and Effective Patient Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Applicable Framework Domains</td>
<td>2A: HIT System Usability, 3A: Use of HIT to improve Patient Safety</td>
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## COMMITTEE RATINGS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>High</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Importance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feasibility</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
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9. HIT-Focused Risk-Management Infrastructure

In order to ensure the safety and safe use of HIT, both healthcare organizations and vendors need a focused risk-management infrastructure in place that can rapidly address and remediate patient safety problems in real time. Healthcare organizations and small ambulatory practices in particular need tools to help them identify and assess patient safety risks attributable to HIT.

The Committee discussed potential concepts for measuring the adequacy of organizational structures, policies, procedures, governance practices, and other activities related to HIT safety risk management. These include whether organizations use multiple sources to assess HIT risks to patient safety; whether organizations engage in formal processes to evaluate and respond to risks identified by other organizations; and the proportion of risk managers who received specific training from The Joint Commission on HIT safety. Committee members suggested that organizations should also be evaluated on whether key HIT safety metrics are shared with their governing boards; the sharing of such metrics illustrates the organization’s culture and commitment to monitoring and responding to HIT-related safety risks, and demonstrates that HIT safety is an organizational priority.

The implementation of EHR systems affords the ability of these systems to actively measure harm (using instruments like the IHI trigger tools), user errors (Adelman’s retract-and-reorder tool), and diagnostic errors. Using currently existing and installed capabilities of EHRs, organizations can use these capabilities with minimal effort to monitor the impact of their operational systems on different measures of safety. Indeed, this approach is rapidly expanding. Committee members suggested this can be accomplished with no burden to front line users and minimal burden to organizations that wish to do so. Committee members noted that these tools are valuable because they measure the actual operational systems as well as system-related outcomes in terms of the actual ability to prevent harm and errors.

The Committee agreed that accountability for having an HIT safety infrastructure would primarily rest with healthcare organizations; however, it is important for vendors to have similar mechanisms to rapidly respond to and remediate software or hardware issues that cause safety risks and problems. The data sources for these measures could come from SAFER guide assessments, security risk assessments, trigger tools, patient complaints, or even lawsuits.
MEASUREMENT RELATED TO THE HIT-FOCUSED RISK-MANAGEMENT INFRASTRUCTURE

Potential Measure Concepts

- Organizations assess HIT risks to patient safety using multiple sources, such as IT help desk tickets, risk management information systems, trigger tools, patient complaints/corrections
- Organizations engage in formal processes for evaluating and responding to risks identified by other organizations, such as PSOs, vendor user groups, and the published literature
- EHR safety metrics shared with the governing board
  - Examples of such governing board metrics include:
    » EHR system uptime rates
    » Alert override and adjustment rates
    » Diagnostic test results either incorrectly reported or delayed in reporting
    » Results of network penetration testing to assess the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of ePHI
    » Adherence to clinical decision support protocols
    » All EHR-related serious safety events
    » Open patient orders (i.e., not acted upon by clinicians) after a set period
    » Changes in mortality rate following EHR system implementation
    » Serious EHR error fix rate
- % of risk managers who have received continuing education units (CEU) from The Joint Commission’s safe HIT module (free)

Accountable Entities
Facility

Potential Data Sources
SAFER Guide Assessments; Security risk assessment; trigger tools; complaints; lawsuits

Primary Framework Domain
2B: Organizational Planning, Preparation, & Governance for HIT

Other Applicable Framework Domains
1C: Data Security
2D: Surveillance and Monitoring of HIT

COMMITTEE RATINGS

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<tr>
<td>Feasibility</td>
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OVERARCHING ISSUES

During the course of the Committee’s deliberations, a number of overarching issues were identified:

1. **HIT quality and safety should be a shared responsibility of clinicians, healthcare organizations, vendors, and in some instances, patients.** Because of the complexity of HIT and the interconnected relationship among hardware, software, the local environment, and providers, it is vital for stakeholders to share responsibility for the quality and safety of HIT. Much like medical devices, HIT is an instrument by which patient care is delivered and improved, but simultaneously can cause harm. Therefore, the responsibility for quality and safety problems should not fall disproportionately on one stakeholder, but rather should be shared among stakeholders that are in the best position to prevent and mitigate a particular patient safety risk and thereby control the intended and unintended consequences of HIT. The Committee reviewed a set of HIT safety-related measure concepts developed specifically for consideration in a shared risk environment, and incorporated aspects of these concepts into their recommendations; the full set of concepts can be found in Appendix I.

2. **Many, if not most, HIT safety issues require attention and solutions across the full HIT lifecycle.** The safety and safe use of HIT systems should be addressed continuously across the cycle of design, implementation, use, evaluation, and feedback. Problems are rarely isolated to any single stage of this cycle, regardless of where and when they are identified. Improving HIT safety must be part of an iterative development process that involves all stakeholders.

3. **Feasibility considerations may limit many important measures of HIT quality and safety.** The Committee considered many of the measure concepts identified to be of high importance but not immediately feasible given limitations in technology, data availability, and resources. As a result, measurement of some of these concepts may be a challenge for both measure developers and implementers. Measure developers and others may need to develop innovative strategies to gather data on concepts important to HIT safety measurement. However, many of the measures identified may be feasibly implemented using data currently in EHRs and without adding significant burden to users or hospitals. Committee members noted that there is a substantial amount of data available in EHRs, and that while there is a need for better techniques to harvest and analyze this data, we need to start somewhere.

4. **The increased data entry burden for clinicians and other staff needs to be considered as one of the most important, broad, unintended consequences of HIT.** The implementation of new HIT systems has often been accompanied by a significant increase in the amount of data that clinicians and other staff are required to enter into the EHR. This amount of data entry through user interfaces that may not be user-friendly can pull clinicians away from the bedside, and can require that providers spend many hours documenting charts during and after their shifts. Increased data entry burden can lead to inappropriate workarounds, which can threaten or undermine patient safety.

5. **Constantly evolving technology may be both a challenge and an opportunity for HIT measure development.** Because HIT is an area of constant evolution and innovation, quality problems may be solved through new technology. Therefore, measure developers will need to stay ahead of the curve by identifying not only current issues, but also anticipating
future issues as new hardware and software are developed.

6. **There are a variety of mechanisms through which HIT safety can be promoted.** The Committee agreed that certain aspects of HIT safety could be addressed through performance measurement and reporting, while others may be better addressed by regulation of HIT or accreditation and certification mechanisms. In addition, there may be measure concepts that straddle multiple mechanisms. Developers should carefully consider the evolving regulatory, accreditation, and certification landscape as they generate new ideas and concepts for quality measures.

7. **Addressing HIT safety problems can be costly, but it is important that healthcare organizations invest the resources required to address them.** Because of the complex nature of HIT safety problems, it can be costly both in time and in capital investment for healthcare organizations to address them. However, HIT safety is so important for 21st century healthcare that organizations must make and sustain this vital investment to ensure safety across the HIT lifecycle. Committee members suggested that developing a business case for measuring HIT safety will be critical to justifying the investments needed to collect and report data. This underscores the importance of creating useful measures of HIT safety which can be used to ensure that organizations, vendors, and clinicians invest resources to address these issues in a timely and ongoing manner.

8. **Many HIT safety issues are being addressed in other programs or initiatives and should be considered as measure developers work to develop new metrics in this area.** For example, stage 2 of Meaningful Use includes requirements aligned with measurement goals identified by the Committee. The ONC’s SAFER Guides for HIT are also closely aligned with measurement areas prioritized by the Committee, and offer tools to address issues as well as potential metrics for further development. In addition, NIST recently released guidelines for evaluating EHR system usability and promoting patient safety through standardization of EHR design elements.

9. **Current NQF criteria for endorsement may not directly apply to many HIT quality measure concepts.** Currently, very specific criteria must be met for importance, scientific acceptability, usability, and feasibility in order for Committees to recommend NQF endorsement of quality measures. These criteria and related guidance have been primarily developed to assess structure, process and outcome measures for clinical care. Because of the design and nature of HIT, many important measures of patient safety may not fit into these algorithms, particularly with respect to evidence (e.g., the link between HIT-related structures or processes and relevant outcomes) and standards for measure testing. For these reasons, the Committee thought that NQF should contemplate adapting the current criteria to include specific considerations for measurement of HIT safety issues. However, Committee members agreed that a high bar should be maintained for NQF endorsement of HIT safety measures.
PUBLIC COMMENTS

Public comment was solicited on a draft version of this report; high-level themes from submitted comments are summarized below. All public comments submitted are also included in Appendix J.

Interoperability

Commenters generally agreed that system interoperability is important and that a lack of interoperability can lead to major safety concerns, such as data silos, incomplete or inaccurate data, and workarounds. Commenters expressed support for universal interface capability, and suggested that measurement around interoperability should encourage standardization of terminologies to ensure that data exchanged between systems is meaningful and consistently interpreted. Commenters also noted that measurement of interoperability could address prevention of inaccurate data transmission to ensure information sent and received is consistently correct. Some commenters suggested that the measure concepts identified by the Committee lacked specificity and may not provide actionable information; the commenters also suggested that measurement efforts should recognize that data errors may cause non-delivery, not just system/interface errors. It was noted that alternative approaches could include measurement of the volume of data exchanged or the number of messages the system receives but fails to deliver to the end user.

Clinical Decision Support

Commenters also agreed that clinical decision support (CDS) is a high-priority area of measurement. However, some thought that the measure concepts identified by the Committee were too narrowly focused on alerts, and that other, broader CDS-related issues are also important to measure. Commenters also noted that measurement of the appropriateness, effectiveness, and correct timing of alerts may be difficult to measure objectively. Some argued that the application of CDS tools to predict and avoid high-risk events such as falls or hospital readmissions is more of an immediately attainable goal than indicated in the report. Commenters also noted that ongoing monitoring of alerts may be challenging, and suggested that an alternative approach could be development of quality standards for the content creation process for alerts. Others remarked that periodic training, education, and measurement of user competency can play an important role in ensuring that clinicians are using CDS as intended.

Patient Engagement

Commenters agreed that patient engagement, including the effective design and use of patient portals, is an important area for HIT safety. Some commenters noted that variability across patient portals may pose a challenge to measurement, suggesting that some standardization may be needed to get comparable data. Commenters suggested that measurement of patient engagement could extend beyond patient portals, potentially including mobile health, telehealth, remote monitoring, and clinical trials. Commenters also cautioned that there is a need for more evidence to lay the groundwork for meaningful measurement around HIT and patient engagement.

Data Entry Burden

Commenters noted that data entry and documentation requirements should be based on sound evidence, focused on meaningful patient care items, and integrated into care in a way that allows clinicians to function at their highest level of practice. It was observed that multiple factors contribute to documentation burden in addition to system design, including internal and external...
Commenters supported measurement around documentation in structured fields versus free text, but noted that all relevant information cannot be structured, meaning there will always be some need for free text. Commenters suggested that measurement around HIT safety should itself add to documentation requirements only if the evidence of added value and benefits outweighs the additional data entry burden.

User-Centered Design
Commenters agreed that it is important to measure usability and user-centered design, while supporting shared accountability in this area, noting that that system usability is affected by factors such as workflow design, organizational requirements, and external compliance requirements. Commenters suggested that involvement of end users (including patients) in the HIT lifecycle would be an important focus of measurement in this area.

Information Sharing
Commenters supported the sharing of lessons learned across the user community, and agreed with the identification of vendor-organization contracts as an important issue. However, commenters also noted that differences in implementation and configuration of HIT systems may limit the applicability of lessons across organizations. Some commenters argued that contract terms themselves may be less important than the way those terms are implemented, and noted that technology developers have an obligation and need to protect intellectual property, which should be taken into consideration when developing measures in this area.

Patient Identification
Commenters agreed that patient identification is a high-priority area, while noting that measurement in this area will require consistency in the tools used to evaluate things like the number and frequency of duplicate patient records. Commenters also noted that transparency of information will be needed for patients to play a more active role in improving patient identification.

Framework
Commenters generally supported the HIT Safety Framework. Some commenters suggested that the framework domains should not be considered as sequential ‘levels’ or ‘phases,’ since all of the domains are important areas of focus for organizations at any stage of HIT adoption or implementation. Commenters noted that the provenance of data is an important consideration related to data integrity, and that access to metadata describing where and how data was created is critical to ensuring its integrity and safe use. Some commenters argued that system interoperability was an important enough issue to warrant its inclusion as a distinct domain within the framework. Commenters suggested that patient portals should comply with the principles of each framework domain, particularly with respect to data completeness.

Other
In addition to the specific areas above, commenters also offered broader feedback and input on the report. Commenters noted that many of the areas of measurement identified by the Committee will be difficult to measure fully and objectively, noting that the challenge for measure developers and other stakeholders going forward will be to take these concepts or areas of focus and provide granular enough detail to allow organizations to apply them in their practice settings in a consistent and standardized way.

Commenters generally agreed with the principle of shared accountability, while some suggested that the report may still focus too much on single actors or system components, rather than on the broader cultural aspects of patient safety. Some commenters expressed concern that the
measure concepts described in the report have the potential to significantly increase administrative burdens for providers, leading to frustration, nonparticipation, and deteriorating usability. These commenters recommended focusing on data that can be captured without imposing documentation requirements that are not related to patient care.

Some commenters also stressed that any HIT safety measures that are developed in the future should meet high standards for importance, scientific acceptability, feasibility, and usability.

THE PATH FORWARD

The implementation and use of HIT holds great promise for the overall improvement of healthcare quality in the United States. However, in order to realize this promise, patient safety must be a primary focus for every stakeholder involved in the design, development, implementation, and use of HIT systems as those systems become increasingly integrated into all aspects of patient care. The work of this Committee is intended to help advance this goal through the creation of a conceptual framework for measuring and addressing HIT safety, and through the identification of key measurement areas and measure concepts that may help to ensure the safety and safe use of HIT systems.

Given the current lack of existing measures for HIT safety, there will be a need for additional research relating the best ways to assess the safety and safe use of HIT, and coordinated measure development efforts focused on the areas that are most important and impactful for patient safety. This report can serve as a basis for continuing efforts to develop measures that can be incorporated throughout the HIT lifecycle as part of an iterative development process; through this iterative process, a knowledge base may emerge to inform future quality and safety improvement efforts.

Advancing the safety and safe use of HIT will require stakeholders to share responsibility and accountability for patient safety; this may require a substantial cultural shift for the many groups involved in the development and use of HIT systems. The Committee recognizes that there are many hurdles to effective measurement of HIT safety, including these potential cultural barriers, as well as collection of data, associated costs, and other practical limitations along with a rapidly evolving sociotechnical environment. Because HIT innovation is moving so fast, it will be vital to develop mechanisms to identify and measure new safety issues that arise from HIT. However, these challenges should not prevent the field from moving forward with meaningful efforts to measure and improve the safety of HIT; indeed, the changing landscape offers a significant opportunity to ensure that patient safety considerations are incorporated into all phases of the HIT lifecycle. The conceptual framework for HIT safety and the Committee's recommendations will continue to evolve as evidence, practices, and technologies mature.
ENDNOTES


clinical-decision-support-systems-an-effective-pathway-to-reduce-medical-errors-and-improve-patient-


32 Meeks DW, Takian A, Sittig D, et al. Exploring the sociotechnical intersection of patient safety and electronic health record implementation. *J Am Med Inform Assoc* 2014; 21(e1); e28–e34.


43 Meeks DW, Takian A, Sittig D, et al. Exploring the sociotechnical intersection of patient safety and electronic health record implementation. *J Am Med Inform Assoc* 2014; 21(e1); e28–e34.


61 MPI = master patient index

62 An “overlap” comprises two patient records from two different facilities that use different MRN “pools” of numbers. The patient may have only one medical record number from each facility, but when aggregated into an enterprise database, the two MRN records from the two different facilities do not link. This represents an “overlap” or an “enterprise duplicate.”


APPENDIX A:
HIT Safety Committee Roster

Elisabeth Belmont, JD (Co-Chair)
Corporate Counsel, MaineHealth

Hardeep Singh, MD, MPH (Co-Chair)
Associate Professor and Chief, Health Policy, Quality and Informatics Program
Houston Veterans Affairs Health Services Research Center of Innovation
Michael E. DeBakey VA Medical Center and Baylor College of Medicine

Jason Adelman, MD, MS
Chief Patient Safety Officer & Associate Chief Quality Officer at NewYork-Presbyterian Hospital/Columbia University Medical Center

Gregory Alexander, PhD, RN, FAAN
Associate Professor, University of Missouri School of Nursing

Gerard Castro, PhD, MPH
Project Director, Patient Safety Initiatives, The Joint Commission

David Classen, MD, MS
Associate Professor of Medicine, University of Utah, Infectious Disease Society of America

Linda Dimitropoulos, PhD
Director, Center for the Advancement of Health IT, RTI International

Lisa Freeman
Board Member, Patient Advocate, Connecticut Center for Patient Safety and Patient Advocacy of

Tejal Gandhi, MD, MPH, CPPS
President, National Patient Safety Foundation

Andrea Gelzer, MD, MS, FACP
Senior Vice President and Corporate Chief Medical Officer, AmeriHealth Caritas Family of Companies

Erin Grace, MHA, (ex officio member)
Director, Patient Safety Program, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ)

Kevin Haynes, PharmD, MSCE
Director of Clinical Epidemiology, HealthCore, a subsidiary of WellPoint Inc.

Laura Heermann Langford, PhD, RN
Intermountain Healthcare

George Hripcsak, MD, MS
Chair, Biomedical Informatics, Columbia University & Director, Medical Informatics, NYP, New York-Presbyterian Hospital

Jason Jones, PhD
Executive Director of Clinical Intelligence and Decision Support, Kaiser Permanente

Nana Khunlertkit, PhD
Senior Human Factors Lead, Johns Hopkins Medicine Armstrong Institute for Patient Safety and Quality

William Marella, MBA
Program Director, Pennsylvania Patient Safety Authority

Dena Mendelsohn, JD, MPH
Health Policy Analyst, Consumers Union / Consumer Reports

James Russell, RPh
Patient Safety Officer, Epic

Eric Schneider, MD, MSc
Senior Vice President for Policy and Research, The Commonwealth Fund

Mark Segal, PhD
Vice President, Government and Industry Affairs, GE Healthcare IT, GE Healthcare

Karen Paul Zimmer, MD, MPH, FAAP
Independent Consultant, Health IT, Patient Safety and Quality
APPENDIX B: Search Strategy

PubMed Search 1:
(“health information technology” OR HIT OR “electronic health record” OR “electronic medical record” OR “decision support” OR CPOE OR “technology-induced”) AND (safety OR “medical error” OR “adverse event” OR “adverse drug event” OR “reporting system” OR “risk management” OR iatrogenesis OR “e-iatrogenesis” OR “hospital-acquired” OR “hospital-associated” OR “healthcare-associated” OR complication OR failure)

Limits: Systematic Reviews, Meta-Analysis; Published in last 5 years; Published in English

Results: 178
Included in initial scan for relevancy: 79
Selected for detailed review: 65

PubMed Search 2:
(“health information technology” OR HIT OR “electronic health record” OR “electronic medical record” OR “decision support” OR CPOE OR “Electronic Medication Administration Record” OR EMAR OR “Picture Archiving and Communication System” OR PACS) AND (“medical error” OR “adverse event” OR “adverse drug event” OR iatrogenesis OR “e-iatrogenesis” OR “hospital-acquired” OR “hospital-associated” OR “healthcare-associated” OR “technology-induced” OR complication OR failure) AND (“reporting system” OR “risk management” OR surveillance OR monitor* OR standard* OR classif* OR detect* OR categor* OR “safety measure” OR “quality measure” OR “performance measure” OR “safety metric” OR “quality metric” OR “performance metric” OR “quality indicator” OR “safety indicator” OR “performance indicator” OR “measure concept”)

Limits: Published in last 5 years; Published in English; Species: Humans

Results: 621
Included in initial scan for relevancy: 92
Selected for detailed review: 23

Additional Parameters:
• Specifically address issues of HIT-related safety (i.e., not only HIT systems issues or patient safety issues, but the impact of HIT on patient safety)
• For the purposes of this review, Health Information Technology (HIT) includes:
  - Electronic Health Records (EHRs)
  - Computerized Prescriber Order Entry (CPOE) Systems
  - Clinical Decision Support (CDS) Systems
  - Picture Archiving and Communications Systems (PACS)
  - Electronic Medication Administration Records (EMAR)

Additional Sources:
• Review of bibliographies from articles identified through search
• Review of NQF’s portfolio of endorsed measures;
• Review of AHRQ’s National Quality Measures Clearinghouse and National Guidelines Clearinghouse;
• Review of the Health Indicators Warehouse;
• Review of the CMS Measures Inventory, including measures under development;
• Review of previous environmental scans conducted by NQF
• Review of references provided by Committee members, colleagues, and federal partners

Total results: 142 articles
APPENDIX C: Key Definitions

Health Information Technology
Health information technology (HIT) is the broad definition of linked software and hardware systems used to collect, store, display, and communicate patient information between providers and healthcare organizations (Sittig & Singh, 2011 - Defining health information technology related errors: New developments since To Err Is Human).

Electronic Medical Record (EMR)
An EMR is a record of health-related information within a single provider or care delivery organization. EMRs do not incorporate interoperability standards, and health-related information cannot be shared outside of the care delivery organization.

Electronic Health Record (EHR)
An EHR is a record of health-related information that is structured for interoperability across providers and care delivery organizations, through the use of nationally recognized standards for information exchange.

Personal Health Record (PHR)
A PHR is a record of health-related information controlled by an individual who determines what information is shared with providers and among care delivery organizations. PHRs also incorporate nationally recognized standards for information exchange.

Health Information Exchange (HIE)
The electronic exchange of health-related information between care delivery organizations based on nationally recognized standards. (From The National Alliance for Health Information Systems report to the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology: Defining Key Health Information Technology Terms. https://www.nachc.com/client/Key%20HIT%20Terms%20Definitions%20Final_April_2008.pdf)

Clinical Data Repository (CDR)
A centralized database of continuously updated health-related records that document all care provided to individuals within care organizations, including radiology and laboratory results, care notes, and pharmacy records. http://www.nasbhc.org/atf/cf/%7bB241D183-DA6F-443F-9588-3230D027D8DB%7d/GlossaryOfHITterms.pdf

Picture Archiving and Communications System (PACS)
A system that digitizes and stores radiological images, eliminating the need for storage of X-ray film and the possibility that films can be lost or misfiled, and images can easily be shared between care organizations. (Strickland, N PACS (picture archiving and communication systems): filmless radiology Arch Dis Child. 2000;83:82-86.)

Computerized Clinical Decision Support Systems (CCDSS/CDS)
A software-based system incorporating a knowledge base of information on diagnoses, drug interactions and care guidelines, and health-related information for an individual, used to guide clinical decisionmaking. CDS systems support clinical care through alerts and reminders and recommended order sets for diagnosis and care plans. (AHRQ Clinical Decision Support Systems: State of the Art retrieved from http://healthit.ahrq.gov/sites/default/files/docs/page/09-0069-EF_1.pdf)

e-Prescribing
The electronic transmission of prescription or prescription information directly to a pharmacy or dispenser from a healthcare provider. http://www.hrpub.org/download/20131215/UJCM1-16900871.pdf.
## APPENDIX D:
Key Findings from Selected Evidence Reviews Related to the Impact of HIT on Safety

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article</th>
<th>Objectives/Methods</th>
<th>Key Findings</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wong, et al. 2010¹</td>
<td>Systematic review of the literature on Drug Interaction Detection Software (DIS) in preventing adverse drug events</td>
<td>Did not identify any quality studies addressing the specific benefits and harms or cost-effectiveness of drug interaction software on medication safety or clinical outcomes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Shojania, et al. 2010² | Systematic review to quantify the effects of computer reminders delivered to clinicians during their routine activities | Results showed that computer reminders improved adherence to processes of care by around 4-6%
A trend toward larger improvements was seen for reminders that required users to enter a response
Computer reminders produced much smaller improvements than those generally expected, and could not reliably predict clinically-worthwhile improvements in care |
| Collins, et al. 2011³ | Before-and-after cohort study to determine the effect of CPOE on oral chemotherapy order, review and administration processes, as well as its effect on chemotherapy-related prescribing errors | CPOE implementation significantly reduced prescribing error risk and eliminated certain types of errors that can lead to significant patient harm, including wrong dosing schedule/duration errors, prescriptions without an indication, and omission (or unclear communication) of drug name or route of administration |
| Georgiou, et al. 2011⁴ | Systematic review aimed at assessing the impact of CPOE on medical-imaging services and patient outcomes | Findings revealed the potential for CPOE to contribute to increased efficiency and effectiveness in imaging services, with most benefits coming in the form of greater adherence to test ordering guidelines
The authors noted that additional work will be required to develop sophisticated evaluation models capable of taking account of the multiple ways in which technology impacts healthcare delivery |
| Maslove et al. 2011⁵ | Literature review of CPOE in the critical care environment | Findings suggested that CPOE shows promise as tool for improving the safety of healthcare, particularly in complex environments such as the ICU
However, the evidence remains equivocal, and must be balanced against the potential for unintended consequences
The authors argue that novel research methods borrowed from the social sciences should continue to be used to generate hypotheses and to explore the complex human engineering factors that affect use of CPOE |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article</th>
<th>Objectives/Methods</th>
<th>Key Findings</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Souza, et al. 2011⁶</td>
<td>Review of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) assessing the effects of CDS for primary preventive care (PPC) on process of care, patient outcomes, harms, and costs</td>
<td>Findings showed that CDS’s effects on patient outcomes, safety, costs of care, and provider satisfaction remain poorly supported. However, the authors suggested that definite conclusions about CDS’s effectiveness are premature, especially with respect to patient outcomes, because of heterogeneity in systems, settings, and outcomes assessed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clyne 2012²</td>
<td>Overview of the current evidence in relation to the use of technologies such as ePrescribing and CDSS to reduce inappropriate medication use in older people, focusing on the prescribing stage</td>
<td>The evidence suggests that various types of e-prescribing and CDSS interventions have the potential to reduce inappropriate prescribing and polypharmacy in older people, but there was significant heterogeneity in study designs, interventions, care settings, and outcomes measured, limiting the conclusions that can be drawn from the results. The authors noted a persistent problem with clinicians overriding or ignoring alerts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cresswell, et al. 2012⁶</td>
<td>Interpretative review of the empirical evidence on computerized decision support systems, their contexts of use, and evidence related to the effectiveness of these tools</td>
<td>Results suggested that CDS resulted in improved provider adherence to guidelines and promotion of preventive medicine under certain conditions. However, evidence regarding the impact of these systems on patient outcomes was inconclusive, with reviews finding little to no consistent benefit in this regard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carling et al. 2013⁹</td>
<td>Systematic review to evaluate assertions that electronic applications for medication management in ambulatory care can themselves result in errors that might harm patients or increase risks to patient safety</td>
<td>Only a minority of studies that investigated the interventions of interest included threats to patients’ safety as outcomes or monitored for adverse events, meaning there was little evidence to substantiate claims of patient harm or increased risks. However, the authors noted that more research is needed to focus on the draw-backs and negative outcomes technology may introduce.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgiou, et al. 2013¹⁰</td>
<td>Systematic review of the quantitative literature related to the effect of computerized provider order entry systems in the emergency department (ED).</td>
<td>The review found tangible benefits of CPOE and decision support in ED environments, including decreased medication errors, improved laboratory turnaround time, and improved guideline compliance. However, the authors acknowledged the limitations imposed by the heterogeneity of study design and outcomes assessed, as well as the difficulty of evaluating the impact of interactions among various aspects of the ED system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article</td>
<td>Objectives/Methods</td>
<td>Key Findings</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Lainer, et al. 2013</strong>&lt;sup&gt;11&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Systematic review of the effects of IT interventions on medication safety in primary care</td>
<td>Only 5 of 10 RCTs revealed a reduction of medication errors in response to IT interventions. The authors suggest that CPOE with CDS was effective if targeted at a limited number of potentially inappropriate medications and/or pre-specified medication problems in high-risk groups, such as patients with renal insufficiency. When decision support systems included extensive and exhaustive information about, for example, potential drug–drug interactions, physicians seemed to be overwhelmed by the complexity of information. The authors identified alert fatigue and override as a safety issue related to IT use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Van der Linden et al. 2013</strong>&lt;sup&gt;12&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Systematic review to identify systems (electronic and non-electronic) that can prevent the re-prescription of drugs withdrawn because of an adverse drug event and the effects of these systems</td>
<td>Several systems to prevent the re-prescription of drugs that elicited an adverse drug event have been developed, but the evidence of these systems’ effectiveness is limited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nuckols, et al. 2014</strong>&lt;sup&gt;13&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Systematic review and meta-analysis of studies assessing the effectiveness of CPOE at reducing preventable adverse drug events (pADEs) in hospital-related settings, and examination of the reasons for heterogeneous effects on medication errors</td>
<td>CPOE implementation was associated with a 50% decline in pADEs in inpatient settings, though the authors note that these studies were poorly designed. The authors suggest that there is not sufficient reporting on many context and implementation variables to evaluate their association with CPOE effectiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ranji, et al. 2014</strong>&lt;sup&gt;14&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Narrative review of specialized literature to identify reviews of the effect of CPOE combined with CDSS on Adverse Drug Event (ADE) rates in inpatient and outpatient settings</td>
<td>CPOE in combination with CDSS is effective at reducing prescribing errors, these benefits to not appear to extend to medication administration errors or clinical ADEs. The authors acknowledged the impact of other system factors and the difficulty of assessing particular HIT tools in isolation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ENDNOTES


## APPENDIX E:
Conceptual Frameworks for Assessment of HIT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author, Year</th>
<th>Article Title</th>
<th>Focus of Framework</th>
<th>Framework Elements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Borycki and Kushniruk 2010²</td>
<td>Towards an Integrative Cognitive-Socio-Technical Approach in Health Informatics: Analyzing Technology-Induced Error Involving Health Information Systems to Improve Patient Safety</td>
<td>To integrate cognitive and socio-technical approaches to assess the impact of health information systems across various modes of user-system interaction</td>
<td>1. Individual interacting with the system (cognitive level) 2. User interacting with the system and environment to do basic work task (basic workflow level) 3. Multiple users interacting with each other and the system to carry out multiple tasks as part of the organization (organizational level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borycki and Keay 2010³</td>
<td>Methods to Assess the Safety of Health Information Systems (HIS)</td>
<td>To classify the methods used in predicting, preventing, and evaluating the potential for an HIS to cause technology-induced error</td>
<td>1. Before HIS implementation (i.e., design, development, procurement, and pre-implementation processes) 2. After HIS implementation 3. After an error has occurred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author, Year</td>
<td>Article Title</td>
<td>Focus of Framework</td>
<td>Framework Elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Safe Use of HIT  
3. Using HIT to Improve Safety                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| Paez et al. 2013  | Health Information Technology and Hospital Patient Safety: A Conceptual Model to Guide Research | To advance a conceptual model that describes how specific health IT functions could affect different types of inpatient safety errors and that accounts for contextual factors influencing successful health IT implementation | 1. Health IT Functions  
a. Health Information and Data  
b. Results Management  
c. Computerized Provider Order Entry  
d. Decision Support  
e. Administrative Process and Reporting  
f. Reporting and Population Health Management  
2. Contextual Factors  
a. End Users  
b. IT System  
c. System Deployment and Maintenance  
3. Categories of Patient Safety Errors  
a. Communication  
b. Patient Management  
c. Clinical Performance  
i. Diagnosis  
j. Intervention |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author, Year</th>
<th>Article Title</th>
<th>Focus of Framework</th>
<th>Framework Elements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Meeks, et al. 2014 | Exploring the sociotechnical intersection of patient safety and electronic health record implementation | To examine the applicability of two previously developed conceptual models comprehensively to understand safety implications of EHR implementation [Combination of Sittig & Singh 2010 and Sittig & Singh 2012] | 1. Safe HIT  
|                  |                                                                               |                                                                                                        | a. Hardware and software  
|                  |                                                                               |                                                                                                        | b. Human-computer interface  
|                  |                                                                               |                                                                                                        | c. People  
|                  |                                                                               |                                                                                                        | d. Workflow and communication  
|                  |                                                                               |                                                                                                        | e. Organizational policies and procedures  
|                  |                                                                               |                                                                                                        | f. External rules, regulations, and pressures  
|                  |                                                                               |                                                                                                        | g. System measurement and monitoring  
|                  |                                                                               |                                                                                                        | 2. Safe Use of HIT  
|                  |                                                                               |                                                                                                        | a. Hardware and software  
|                  |                                                                               |                                                                                                        | b. Human-computer interface  
|                  |                                                                               |                                                                                                        | c. People  
|                  |                                                                               |                                                                                                        | d. Workflow and communication  
|                  |                                                                               |                                                                                                        | e. Organizational policies and procedures  
|                  |                                                                               |                                                                                                        | f. External rules, regulations, and pressures  
|                  |                                                                               |                                                                                                        | g. System measurement and monitoring  
|                  |                                                                               |                                                                                                        | 3. Using HIT to Improve Safety  
|                  |                                                                               |                                                                                                        | a. Hardware and software  
|                  |                                                                               |                                                                                                        | b. Human-computer interface  
|                  |                                                                               |                                                                                                        | c. People  
|                  |                                                                               |                                                                                                        | d. Workflow and communication  
|                  |                                                                               |                                                                                                        | e. Organizational policies and procedures  
|                  |                                                                               |                                                                                                        | f. External rules, regulations, and pressures  
|                  |                                                                               |                                                                                                        | g. System measurement and monitoring |
ENDNOTES


APPENDIX F:  
Eight-Dimensional Sociotechnical Model of Safe and Effective EHR Use

APPENDIX G: SAFER/Sociotechnical Model

## APPENDIX H:
List of Measure Concepts Considered for Prioritization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
<th>Accountable Entity</th>
<th>Primary Framework Domain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td># of times key test results not available for diagnosis</td>
<td>HIT systems and associated workflows should be designed, configured, and implemented to allow for efficient access to necessary information; Clinicians should search for necessary information (e.g. old test results; clinic notes; care plans) and use this information for the current encounter</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>1A - Data Availability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>% of lab results that do not cross interface between EHR and LIS</td>
<td>HIT systems should be designed, configured, and implemented to allow for complete and accurate transmission of data across internal and external systems</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>1A - Data Availability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ability to document individualized patient goals and preferences</td>
<td>HIT system design, development, and implementation should ensure systems can document individualized patient goals and preferences; All team members should be able to add to this individualized list of goals, including the patient</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>1A - Data Availability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Inability to retrieve necessary information</td>
<td>HIT systems and associated workflows should be designed, configured, and implemented to allow for efficient access to necessary information</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>1A - Data Availability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Is system interoperable with other healthcare systems? Regionally? Nationally?</td>
<td>HIT systems should be designed, configured, and implemented to allow for interoperability with other healthcare systems</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>1A - Data Availability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>System design to facilitate information transfer at transitions in care</td>
<td>HIT systems and associated workflows should be designed, configured, and implemented to allow for efficient, timely, and complete transmission of appropriate information</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>1A - Data Availability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>System supports HIE between systems (e.g., EHR, LIS), mobile health applications?</td>
<td>HIT systems should be designed, configured, and implemented to enable transmission of HIE data as appropriate</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>1A - Data Availability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>System supports HIE between vendors</td>
<td>HIT systems should be designed, configured, and implemented to enable transmission of HIE data as appropriate</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>1A - Data Availability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>External data via HIE is added to patient record</td>
<td>HIT systems should be designed, configured, and implemented to enable the pushing of data to HIE</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>1A - Data Availability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Concept</td>
<td>Rationale</td>
<td>Accountable Entity</td>
<td>Primary Framework Domain</td>
</tr>
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<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Unexpected downtime affecting &gt;100 patients and lasting &gt;8 hours</td>
<td>HIT system design, development, and implementation should ensure systems are reliable and available when needed; Facilities should have appropriate plans and processes in place to prevent unexpected downtime and to minimize its length and impact if it does occur.</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>1A - Data Availability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>% duplicate patients in EHR</td>
<td>HIT systems and associated workflows should be designed, configured, implemented, and used in a way that prevents duplication of patient records</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility, Clinician</td>
<td>1B - Data Integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Quality of external prescription data</td>
<td>HIT systems should be designed, configured, and implemented to allow for complete and accurate transmission of data across internal and external systems</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>1B - Data Integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Ability to chart necessary information</td>
<td>HIT systems and associated workflows should be designed, configured, and implemented to allow for efficient and timely entry of/access to appropriate information</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>2A - Health IT System Usability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Diagnostics or testing with patients conducted to assess usability</td>
<td>Design, development, and implementation of HIT systems should involve diagnostics and testing with patients to ensure adequate system usability</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>2A - Health IT System Usability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>End user involvement in design and development process</td>
<td>Vendors should involve end users in the design and development of HIT systems</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>2A - Health IT System Usability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Readability of alerts and other messages</td>
<td>HIT systems should be designed, configured, and implemented to ensure alerts and other messages are readable by users</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>2A - Health IT System Usability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Speed of system/EHR response time</td>
<td>HIT systems and associated workflows should be designed, configured, and implemented to ensure adequate system usability and to promote safe and efficient HIT use</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>2A - Health IT System Usability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Ability of HIT system to pick up problem prescriptions across different systems</td>
<td>HIT systems and associated workflows should be designed, configured, and implemented to pick up problem prescriptions across different systems</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>2D - Surveillance and Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Best practices for implementation, CDS, and knowledge management shared across organizations and vendors</td>
<td>Vendors and facilities should identify and disseminate best practices across organizations and vendors</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>2D - Surveillance and Monitoring</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>System limitations determined and communicated with end users</td>
<td>System limitations should be determined and should be fully and clearly communicated to end users</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>2D - Surveillance and Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Vendor notifications sent to all users following identification of software, hardware, or other issues that materially affect patient safety</td>
<td>Upon identification of software, hardware, or other issues that materially affect patient safety, vendors should notify all users of the affected product</td>
<td>Vendor</td>
<td>2D - Surveillance and Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Vendor provides solutions to identified errors to all users ASAP following event</td>
<td>Vendors should identify and disseminate solutions for safety events caused by HIT software or hardware as soon as possible</td>
<td>Vendor</td>
<td>2D - Surveillance and Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Vendors share lessons across each other</td>
<td>Vendors should identify lessons from implementation experience and share them within the vendor community</td>
<td>Vendor</td>
<td>2D - Surveillance and Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Vendors share lessons across institutions</td>
<td>Vendors should identify lessons from implementation experience and share them across user institutions</td>
<td>Vendor</td>
<td>2D - Surveillance and Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Effective vendor user groups</td>
<td>Vendors should establish effective user groups to help in identification of problems and lessons</td>
<td>Vendor</td>
<td>2D - Surveillance and Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Free and transparent exchange of information about HIT user experiences and issues</td>
<td>The Health IT vendors with whom the organization contracts for hardware or software licenses and related services support the free exchange of information about Health IT user experiences and issues and do not prohibit sharing of such information, including details (e.g., screenshots) relating to patient safety, and make comparative user experiences publicly available</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>2D - Surveillance and Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Software and hardware agreements permit shared learning and research, and promote shared accountability</td>
<td>Health IT software license and maintenance agreements and hardware purchase agreements contain contractual provisions which promote patient safety by permitting shared learning and research on Health IT and patient safety, including research on usability and interoperability. Such agreements should fairly allocate responsibility for acts and omissions to parties who are primarily responsible for the conduct that led to the acts or omissions</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>2D - Surveillance and Monitoring</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>Lack of adequate data security/ data security not continuously improved to address new threats</td>
<td>HIT systems and associated workflows should be designed, configured, implemented, used, maintained, and governed in a way that ensures appropriate data security</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility, Clinician</td>
<td>1C - Data Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Test results released via portal to wrong patients</td>
<td>HIT systems and associated workflows should be designed, configured, implemented, and used in a way that ensures patient information is released only to appropriate and authorized parties</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility, Clinician</td>
<td>1C - Data Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Organization has addressed security risks in compliance with applicable standards and requirements</td>
<td>The organization has implemented measures of security risk compliance consistent with the HIPAA Security Rule, HITECH Meaningful Use Requirements, guidance of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, applicable accreditation standards and patient safety-related best practices to ensure that: (i) EHR system data or information is accessible and useable upon demand by an authorized person; (ii) EHR system data or information have not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner; and (iii) the EHR system employs currently available patient matching technology and capabilities to accurately match data to a particular patient consistent with commercially reasonable standards</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>1C - Data Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>“Through-time” or number of clicks needed to perform common tasks (compared across types and levels of users)</td>
<td>HIT systems and associated workflows should be designed, configured, and implemented to ensure adequate system usability and to promote safe and efficient HIT use</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>2A - Health IT System Usability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td># of hours per provider FTE spent charting after shift</td>
<td>The interface for clinical documentation should be designed in a way that facilitates ease of and minimizes time burdens for documenting histories / physicals / re-evaluations and clinical care actions; one process measure may be the number of hours that clinicians spend documenting charts during or after their shift.</td>
<td>Facility, Clinician</td>
<td>2A - Health IT System Usability</td>
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<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td># of records not completed (or % complete) during patient visit/ clinical scheduled shift</td>
<td>Care must be documented contemporaneously in the medical record; one way to measure this would be to count the number or proportion of medical records not completed during or after a scheduled clinical shift.</td>
<td>Facility, Clinician</td>
<td>2A - Health IT System Usability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Documentation interface</td>
<td>The interface for clinical documentation should be designed in a way that facilitates ease of and minimizes time burdens for documenting histories / physicals / re-evaluations and clinical care actions</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>2A - Health IT System Usability</td>
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<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>End users requirements determined prior to implementation</td>
<td>Facilities should determine end user requirements before implementing new or redesigned HIT systems</td>
<td>Vendor</td>
<td>2A - Health IT System Usability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Extent of HIT system integration (e.g., fully integrated vs. separate applications for different functions, requiring frequent switches between applications)</td>
<td>HIT systems and associated workflows should be designed, configured, and implemented in a way that ensures appropriate integration within and across systems and/or applications</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>2A - Health IT System Usability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Increased cost of system workarounds (overtime, scribes, decrease in patient throughput/seen, etc.) shared by vendor (usability)</td>
<td>HIT systems and associated workflows should be designed, configured, implemented, and employed in a way that reduces the need for/use of workarounds; when poor system usability leads to workarounds, vendors should share in any increased costs generated by these workarounds</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>2A - Health IT System Usability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Robust usability evaluation for system redesign</td>
<td>Prior to implementing system redesigns, facilities should ensure that new systems have undergone robust usability evaluations</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>2A - Health IT System Usability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Survey-based measure derived from a psychometric scale or multi-item survey instrument allowing users to rate system usability</td>
<td>HIT systems and associated workflows should be designed, configured, and implemented to account for user needs and ensure adequate system usability</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>2A - Health IT System Usability</td>
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<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Appropriate software license and maintenance agreement</td>
<td>The organization has a written hardware purchase or software license and maintenance agreement with Health IT vendors specifying how the vendors will work with their customers on safety and quality involving the implementation, customization, and use of Health IT products and services. The agreement contains language consistent with evolving standards on quality and risk management of clinical health information technology systems and networks</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>2B - Organizational Planning, Preparation, and Governance for Health IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Presence of advanced decision support (e.g., geriatric dosing, renal dosing)</td>
<td>HIT systems and associated workflows should be designed, configured, and implemented to enable advanced decision support</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>2C - Complete/Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Presence of order sets for the most common admission diagnoses</td>
<td>HIT systems and associated workflows should be designed, configured, and implemented to enable appropriate decision support</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>2C - Complete/Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Whether the EHR implementation supports tiered alerting</td>
<td>HIT systems and associated workflows should be configured and implemented to support tiered alerting</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>2C - Complete/Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Risk-based analysis of help desk reports</td>
<td>Facilities should analyze help desk reports to identify potential HIT-related safety risks</td>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>2D - Surveillance and Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td># or % of patients that access and use their patient portal</td>
<td>HIT systems, features, and functionality, including patient portal applications, should be designed, implemented, and used in a way that facilitates safe and effective patient engagement; the frequency with which patients access portals should be measured to inform assessments of patient portal usability</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>3B - Health IT Facilitates Safe and Effective Patient Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>% of the complete record (including progress notes) available to patient in PHR</td>
<td>HIT systems, features, and functionality, including patient portal applications, should be designed, implemented, and used in a way that facilitates safe and effective patient engagement; patient portals should include the ability of patients to view all appropriate information</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>3B - Health IT Facilitates Safe and Effective Patient Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Ability/transparency of patient to contribute to the record and be able to see their contributions in EHR</td>
<td>HIT systems, features, and functionality, including patient portal applications, should be designed, implemented, and used in a way that facilitates safe and effective patient engagement; patient portals should include the ability for patients to contribute to their health record</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>3B - Health IT Facilitates Safe and Effective Patient Engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Completeness of patient portal data</td>
<td>HIT systems, features, and functionality, including patient portal applications, should be designed, implemented, and used in a way that facilitates safe and effective patient engagement</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>3B - Health IT Facilitates Safe and Effective Patient Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Patient portal incorporates clinical view</td>
<td>HIT systems, features, and functionality, including patient portal applications, should be designed, implemented, and used in a way that facilitates safe and effective patient engagement</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>3B - Health IT Facilitates Safe and Effective Patient Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Patient portal is difficult/ confusing to navigate</td>
<td>HIT systems, features, and functionality, including patient portal applications, should be designed, implemented, and used in a way that facilitates safe and effective patient engagement</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>3B - Health IT Facilitates Safe and Effective Patient Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Patient portals are not linked to all providers</td>
<td>HIT systems, features, and functionality, including patient portal applications, should be designed, implemented, and used in a way that facilitates safe and effective patient engagement</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>3B - Health IT Facilitates Safe and Effective Patient Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Patient satisfaction with patient portal and clinician interaction with patient</td>
<td>HIT systems, features, and functionality, including patient portal applications, should be designed, implemented, and used in a way that facilitates safe and effective patient engagement; patient satisfaction with the design, implementation, and clinician use of portals should be assessed through surveys or other methods of feedback</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility, Clinician</td>
<td>3B - Health IT Facilitates Safe and Effective Patient Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Patient’s discharge summary offered in print and digitally available via patient portal or email (patient’s choice)</td>
<td>HIT systems, features, and functionality, including patient portal applications, should be designed, implemented, and used in a way that facilitates safe and effective patient engagement; discharge information should be available through patient portals in addition to printed materials</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>3B - Health IT Facilitates Safe and Effective Patient Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Proficiency of patients to use portals</td>
<td>HIT systems, features, and functionality, including patient portal applications, should be designed, implemented, and used in a way that facilitates safe and effective patient engagement; patients should receive education and assistance to ensure they are using portals safely and effectively</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>3B - Health IT Facilitates Safe and Effective Patient Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Existence of shared data warehouse within regions</td>
<td>Could be applied at a community or regional level?</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1A - Data Availability</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Post-downtime testing or assessment to ensure all systems are back up and running.</td>
<td>Facilities should have appropriate plans and processes in place to minimize the length and impact of downtime and other system failures</td>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>1A - Data Availability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Appropriateness of HIT installment (e.g., no printer in office, back to patient when on device)</td>
<td>HIT systems should be implemented in a way that ensures usability and accounts for the needs of patients and clinicians</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>2A - Health IT System Usability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Use of Leapfrog EMR flight simulator to measure risk</td>
<td>Design, configuration, and implementation of HIT systems should involve use of ‘flight simulation’ to ensure system safety and usability</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>2A - Health IT System Usability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>% of clinicians participating in a downtime drill in last 12 months</td>
<td>Facilities should have appropriate plans and processes in place to minimize the length and impact of downtime and other system failures</td>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>2B - Organizational Planning, Preparation, and Governance for Health IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>% time dedicated to training &amp; implementation</td>
<td>When implementing new or redesigned HIT systems, facilities should ensure that adequate time is allotted for training and implementation needs</td>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>2B - Organizational Planning, Preparation, and Governance for Health IT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 61 | Communication/ training  
   • System build  
   • System update                                                    | Facilities should ensure that users receive appropriate communication and training on HIT system changes (builds or updates)                                                                                                                                                                                                  | Facility            | 2B - Organizational Planning, Preparation, and Governance for Health IT |
<p>| 62 | Presence, documentation, and maintenance of an IT-focused disaster recovery plan consistent with HIPAA requirements | As part of its overall emergency preparedness plan, the organization has an IT-focused Disaster Recovery Plan consistent with the requirements of the HIPAA Security Rule to establish (and implement as needed) procedures to: (i) create and maintain retrievable exact copies of ePHI; (ii) restore any loss of data; (iii) enable continuation of critical business processes for protection of the security of ePHI while operating in emergency mode; and (iv) procedures for obtaining necessary ePHI during an emergency. Such a plan is documented and routinely updated | Vendor, Facility    | 2B - Organizational Planning, Preparation, and Governance for Health IT |</p>
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<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>Disaster recovery plan addresses disruptions in access and ensures EHR availability</td>
<td>If the organization utilizes a cloud-based EHR, the disaster recovery plan addresses disruptions in access to an ISP or cloud-based EHR vendor to ensure the availability of the EHR for both treatment and billing services</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>2B - Organizational Planning, Preparation, and Governance for Health IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Security risk analysis and correction of identified security deficiencies</td>
<td>The organization conducts a security risk analysis of the potential threats and vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of electronic protected health information (ePHI) that may affect its disaster preparedness efforts consistent with the requirements of the HIPAA Security Rule and HITECH Meaningful Use Requirements, and corrects identified security deficiencies</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>2B - Organizational Planning, Preparation, and Governance for Health IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>Evidence of backup plans for inevitable failures</td>
<td>Facilities should have appropriate plans and processes in place to minimize the length and impact of downtime and other system failures</td>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>2B - Organizational Planning, Preparation, and Governance for Health IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>Lack of an emergency preparedness plan or failure to update EP plan</td>
<td>Facilities should create plans, processes, and security precautions to ensure emergency preparedness and update those plans as appropriate</td>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>2B - Organizational Planning, Preparation, and Governance for Health IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>Proficiency testing of users</td>
<td>Facilities should conduct proficiency testing of users as needed to ensure that HIT systems will be used safely and correctly</td>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>2B - Organizational Planning, Preparation, and Governance for Health IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>Provider arranges for needed training</td>
<td>Facilities should ensure that users have access to any training needed for HIT system use</td>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>2B - Organizational Planning, Preparation, and Governance for Health IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Repetitive proficiency testing of users (annual?) to accommodate updates and changes</td>
<td>Facilities should conduct proficiency testing of users as needed to ensure that HIT systems will be used safely and correctly</td>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>2B - Organizational Planning, Preparation, and Governance for Health IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Users know what to expect after implementation (workflow changes)</td>
<td>Facilities should ensure that users are trained and prepared for any changes in workflow due to HIT system implementation</td>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>2B - Organizational Planning, Preparation, and Governance for Health IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>% of clinicians with &gt;100 in-basket alerts per day</td>
<td>HIT systems should be configured and implemented to ensure appropriate calibration of alerts</td>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>2C - Complete/Correct Health IT Use</td>
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<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>Alert rate (as % of total orders of % of total patients)</td>
<td>HIT systems should be configured and implemented to ensure appropriate calibration of alerts</td>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>2C - Complete/Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>Average &amp; max alerts per day per provider inbox</td>
<td>HIT systems should be configured and implemented to ensure appropriate calibration of alerts</td>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>2C - Complete/Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>False positive alert rate (% of alerts for which action was taken?)</td>
<td>HIT systems should be configured and implemented to ensure appropriate calibration of alerts</td>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>2C - Complete/Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Survey of end users on workarounds • Results should be analyzed from a human-computer, workflow process, and hardware/software perspective</td>
<td>Facilities should use surveys or other methods of feedback to assess whether clinicians are using HIT systems completely and correctly</td>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>2C - Complete/Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>Survey of users – “Do you use xyz function?” or “Do you know if this function exists?”</td>
<td>Facilities should use surveys or other methods of feedback to evaluate user knowledge and to assess whether clinicians are using HIT systems completely and correctly</td>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>2C - Complete/Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>Whether CDS is set to default</td>
<td>HIT systems and associated workflows should be configured and implemented to enable appropriate decision support</td>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>2C - Complete/Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>Workflow is matched with expected use cases</td>
<td>Design, configuration, and implementation of HIT systems and associated workflows should involve matching of workflow with expected use cases</td>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>2C - Complete/Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>Workflow with cognitive mapping completed before implementation</td>
<td>Design, configuration, and implementation of HIT systems and associated workflows should involve cognitive mapping to ensure adequate system usability</td>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>2C - Complete/Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>Organization has conducted a self-assessment with SAFER guides</td>
<td>Facilities should conduct self-assessments using the SAFER guides to ensure that HIT systems are being implemented and used in a way that protects patient safety</td>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>2D - Surveillance and Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>Patient validation of abnormal test results</td>
<td>HIT systems, features, and functionality, including patient portal applications, should be designed, implemented, and used in a way that facilitates safe and effective patient engagement; patients should have the ability to validate information through portals, and clinical workflow should incorporate routine patient verification of abnormal test results</td>
<td>Facility, Clinician</td>
<td>3A - Use of HIT to improve Patient Safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Concept</td>
<td>Rationale</td>
<td>Accountable Entity</td>
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<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>Organizational culture – HIT Safety</td>
<td>The organization’s culture of safety includes shared involvement and responsibility to address the potential risks associated with the use of Health IT. This requires periodic re-evaluation of the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders, including the healthcare organization, clinicians, and vendors/developers</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility</td>
<td>2B - Organizational Planning, Preparation, and Governance for Health IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td># of times CDS (or alerts) module turned off</td>
<td>HIT systems should be configured and implemented to ensure appropriate calibration of alerts; clinicians should use HIT features and functionality as intended, employing decision support as appropriate and being mindful of alerts</td>
<td>Facility, Clinician</td>
<td>2C - Complete/Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td># of times cut/paste used</td>
<td>Clinicians should minimize use of cut/paste to avoid potential errors information entry</td>
<td>Clinician</td>
<td>2C - Complete/Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td># of times data available from/through HIE source is accessed/viewed/used</td>
<td>HIT systems and associated workflows should be designed, configured, and implemented to incorporate use of data available through HIE; clinicians should identify and use available data (including HIE data) as appropriate</td>
<td>Facility, Clinician</td>
<td>2C - Complete/Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td># of use and user errors</td>
<td>HIT systems and associated workflows should be designed, configured, and implemented to ensure adequate system usability and to promote safe and efficient HIT use; clinicians should use HIT features and functionality as intended</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility, Clinician</td>
<td>2C - Complete/Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td># of workarounds employed</td>
<td>HIT systems and associated workflows should be designed, configured, implemented, and employed in a way that reduces the need for/use of workarounds</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility, Clinician</td>
<td>2C - Complete/Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td># or % of abnormal test results not followed up</td>
<td>HIT systems and associated workflows should be configured, implemented, and used in a way that ensures abnormal test results are identified and addressed</td>
<td>Facility, Clinician</td>
<td>2C - Complete/Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>% of [#] randomly selected charts with active problems/allergies in free text not in problem list/allergy fields</td>
<td>Clinicians should use HIT features and functionality as intended, and avoid the use of free text when relevant fields or pre-populated lists are available</td>
<td>Clinician</td>
<td>2C - Complete/Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>% of orders entered by the prescriber (or % verbal orders)</td>
<td>HIT systems and associated workflows should be designed, configured, and implemented to allow for efficient and timely entry of appropriate information; prescribing clinicians should enter orders promptly, completely, and appropriately</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility, Clinician</td>
<td>2C - Complete/Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
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<td>#</td>
<td>Concept</td>
<td>Rationale</td>
<td>Accountable Entity</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>% physician adoption of CPOE o % of CPOE use</td>
<td>HIT systems and associated workflows should be designed, configured, and implemented to ensure adequate system usability and to promote safe and efficient HIT use; clinicians should use HIT features and functionality as intended</td>
<td>Facility, Clinician</td>
<td>2C - Complete/ Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>Content of transition of care information</td>
<td>Transition record must be complete; specifically with a focus on outstanding issues, clinical questions, or test results that need to be addressed</td>
<td>Facility, Clinician</td>
<td>2C - Complete/ Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>Delays in clinician documentation that result in missed alerts</td>
<td>Care must be documented contemporaneously in the medical record; delays in documentation may lead to missed alerts where clinical decision support that recommends an action is not triggered because documentation is not contemporaneous.</td>
<td>Facility, Clinician</td>
<td>2C - Complete/ Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>Free text charting when there is a coded item available</td>
<td>Clinicians should use HIT features and functionality as intended, and avoid the use of free text when a relevant coded item is available</td>
<td>Clinician</td>
<td>2C - Complete/ Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>Medication reconciliation performed through interoperable information exchange (if available)</td>
<td>HIT systems and associated workflows should be designed, configured, and implemented to support medication reconciliation through interoperable information exchange; clinicians should identify and use information available through interoperable exchanges for medication reconciliation</td>
<td>Facility, Clinician</td>
<td>2C - Complete/ Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>Patient transition record reviewed by the treating provider</td>
<td>Clinicians should review available information during care transitions</td>
<td>Facility, Clinician</td>
<td>2C - Complete/ Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>Patient transition record transmitted electronically at the transition in care (e.g. post-visit or at time of referral)</td>
<td>Clinicians should ensure timely transmission of information to facilitate care transition</td>
<td>Facility, Clinician</td>
<td>2C - Complete/ Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>Presence of hybrid workflows – partially electronic, partially paper</td>
<td>HIT systems and associated workflows should be designed, configured, and implemented to enable fully-electronic workflows and eliminate or minimize the need for hybrid electronic/paper workflows; clinicians should use HIT features and functionality as intended, and avoid the use of hybrid workflows</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility, Clinician</td>
<td>2C - Complete/ Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Concept</td>
<td>Rationale</td>
<td>Accountable Entity</td>
<td>Primary Framework Domain</td>
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<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>Review of a care plan when a care plan is available</td>
<td>Care plans should be reviewed when available in the electronic health record to ensure that care during the current encounter is in line with the care plan</td>
<td>Facility, Clinician</td>
<td>2C - Complete/Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>The use of scribes</td>
<td>HIT systems and associated workflows should be designed, configured, and implemented to allow for efficient and timely entry of appropriate information; clinicians should enter orders promptly, completely, and appropriately</td>
<td>Vendor, Facility, Clinician</td>
<td>2C - Complete/Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>Use of barcode scanning in medication preparation</td>
<td>HIT systems and associated workflows should be designed, configured, and implemented to enable and ensure the use of barcode scanning in medication preparation; Clinicians should use HIT features and functionality as intended, and use barcode scanning in medication preparation if available</td>
<td>Facility, Clinician</td>
<td>2C - Complete/Correct Health IT Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>Routine patient verification of medication list</td>
<td>HIT systems, features, and functionality, including patient portal applications, should be designed, implemented, and used in a way that facilitates safe and effective patient engagement; patients should have the ability to validate information through portals, and clinical workflow should incorporate routine patient verification of medication lists</td>
<td>Facility, Clinician</td>
<td>3A - Use of HIT to improve Patient Safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>Patient messages sent through patient portals receive responses within 24 hours</td>
<td>HIT systems, features, and functionality, including patient portal applications, should be designed, implemented, and used in a way that facilitates safe and effective patient engagement; messages sent by patients through secure portals should receive prompt and appropriate responses</td>
<td>Clinician</td>
<td>3B - Health IT Facilitates Safe and Effective Patient Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>Patient preferences for access obtained and implemented</td>
<td>HIT systems, features, and functionality, including patient portal applications, should be designed, implemented, and used in a way that facilitates safe and effective patient engagement; patient preferences around use and access of portals should be obtained and implemented</td>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>3B - Health IT Facilitates Safe and Effective Patient Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>Recording of patient preferences regarding how information is transmitted and to whom (patient, caregiver, etc.)</td>
<td>HIT systems, features, and functionality, including patient portal applications, should be designed, implemented, and used in a way that facilitates safe and effective patient engagement; patient preferences around use and access of portals should be obtained and implemented</td>
<td>Facility, Clinician</td>
<td>3B - Health IT Facilitates Safe and Effective Patient Engagement</td>
</tr>
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<td>#</td>
<td>Concept</td>
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<td>Accountable Entity</td>
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<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>Timely transmission of patient lab/test results to patient portal</td>
<td>HIT systems, features, and functionality, including patient portal applications, should be designed, implemented, and used in a way that facilitates safe and effective patient engagement; lab/test results and other important information should be transmitted to patients through portals promptly and completely</td>
<td>Facility, Clinician</td>
<td>3B - Health IT Facilitates Safe and Effective Patient Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td># of patient portals that a patient has</td>
<td>HIT systems, features, and functionality, including patient portal applications, should be designed, implemented, and used in a way that facilitates safe and effective patient engagement; structures and processes should be put in place to ensure that patients do not have multiple portals</td>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>3B - Health IT Facilitates Safe and Effective Patient Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>Use of open notes</td>
<td>HIT systems, features, and functionality, including patient portal applications, should be designed, implemented, and used in a way that facilitates safe and effective patient engagement; clinicians should make use of open notes to ensure transparency of information for patients</td>
<td>Clinician</td>
<td>3B - Health IT Facilitates Safe and Effective Patient Engagement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX I: Proposed Measure Concepts for a Shared Risk Environment

1. Allocation of Responsibility for Health IT and Converging Technologies\(^1\)
   Safety Among Participating Stakeholders

   1.1 The organization’s culture of safety includes shared involvement and responsibility to address the potential risks associated with the use of Health IT. This requires periodic re-evaluation of the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders, including the healthcare organization, clinicians, and vendors/developers. The importance of Health IT and patient safety has been recognized by the recent efforts of regulatory agencies,\(^2\) accrediting organizations,\(^3\) certification bodies, recommendations of the Institute of Medicine to improve the safe design, implementation, and use of Health IT,\(^4\) and patient safety-related best practices.\(^5\) As part of the Health IT vendor selection criteria, healthcare organizations and clinicians should consider the willingness of a particular vendor to meet the measures described below.

   1.2 The organization has a written hardware purchase or software license and maintenance agreement with Health IT vendors specifying how the vendors will work with their customers on safety and quality involving the implementation, customization, and use of Health IT products and services. The agreement contains language consistent with evolving standards on quality and risk management of clinical health information technology systems and networks.\(^6\) The following contractual elements are included to minimize the associated risks and promote the safe use of Health IT:

   - The agreement clearly defines and documents the roles of the participating organization, clinicians, Health IT vendors, and software and hardware developers with respect to the safe deployment, implementation and use of the supporting tools and technologies, and ongoing maintenance and upgrades.

   - The agreement requires Health IT vendors to cooperate in the investigation of technology-related deaths, serious injuries, or unsafe conditions associated with the use of such technology.

   - The agreement requires Health IT vendors to give timely notice to users if the vendors identify or become aware of software deficiencies, hardware defects, implementation errors, poor design or usability, misinterpreted user-technology interfaces, or other causes that materially affect patient safety.

   - The agreement requires Health IT vendors to be responsible for collaborating with organizations and clinicians to provide solutions for identified patient safety issues to all users (e.g., workflow guidance, features that should not be used, software updates).

   - The agreement clearly allocates responsibility for ensuring adequate training and education of users, appropriate resourcing, customization, and use of Health IT in accordance with risk assessment, vendor recommendations, and organizational policy.

   - The party who has the most control over the factors giving rise to a particular HIT patient safety risk is in the best position to prevent and mitigate such a risk and thus
is the one charged with responsibility for preventing and mitigating such risk in the agreement.

1.3 The Health IT vendors with whom the organization contracts for hardware or software licenses and related services support the free exchange of information about Health IT user experiences and issues and do not prohibit sharing of such information, including details (e.g., screenshots) relating to patient safety, and make comparative user experiences publicly available.⁷

1.4 Health IT software license and maintenance agreements and hardware purchase agreements contain contractual provisions which promote patient safety by permitting shared learning and research on Health IT and patient safety, including research on usability and interoperability. Additionally, such agreements should fairly allocate responsibility for acts and omissions to parties who are primarily responsible for the conduct that led to the acts or omissions.⁸ In negotiating with Health IT vendors, healthcare organizations, and vendors consider the following provisions:

- Customers should avoid “hold harmless” clauses in vendor contracts that require them to indemnify vendors for the vendors’ acts or omissions, including errors, injuries, or malpractice claims arising from use of the product.

- Customers should ensure that “limitations of liability” clauses in vendor contracts are sufficient to cover customers’ reasonable damages caused by the vendor’s breach and do not limit the vendor’s liability for certain kinds of conduct including: (i) claims subject to indemnification; (ii) personal injury (including death) and damage to real or tangible personal property; (iii) privacy and security breaches; (iv) damages arising from the other party’s negligence or willful misconduct; and (v) damages relating to the vendor’s repudiation of or wrongful refusal to perform its obligations under the agreement.

- Contract terms, including nondisclosure, confidentiality, and other intellectual property protections should not be broader than reasonably necessary to protect the vendor’s legitimate intellectual property interests, when balanced against patient safety concerns. Vendor contracts should not prohibit complete and accurate adverse event reporting (including disclosure of screenshots as part of voluntary adverse event reports to patient safety organizations or accrediting organizations). Moreover, such provisions should not prohibit public disclosure of comparative user experiences with respect to identified Health IT products or independent, third-party safety-related research and reporting, including on the usability or interoperability of specific Health IT vendor products and services.

- Contracts should include performance warranties with respect to the Health IT vendor’s standard system, customizations and third-party software integral to the expected functionality of the system which specifically address Health IT safety during design, implementation, and ongoing maintenance in areas of known risk (e.g., failure to conform with acceptance criteria; system availability and response time; equipment configuration necessary to meet performance warranties; quality and timeliness of service; keylocks or other devices which allow vendors to automatically disable the system in the event of a dispute; malicious programs or devices such as viruses, worms, malware, or other forms of computer sabotage).
2. Ensuring Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of EHR Data

2.1 The organization conducts a security risk analysis of the potential threats and vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic protected health information (ePHI) that may affect its disaster preparedness efforts consistent with the requirements of the HIPAA Security Rule and HITECH Meaningful Use Requirements, and corrects identified security deficiencies.

2.2 As part of its overall emergency preparedness plan, the organization has an IT-focused disaster recovery plan consistent with the requirements of the HIPAA Security Rule to establish (and implement as needed) procedures to: (i) create and maintain retrievable exact copies of ePHI; (ii) restore any loss of data; (iii) enable continuation of critical business processes for protection of the security of ePHI while operating in emergency mode; and (iv) procedures for obtaining necessary ePHI during an emergency. Such a plan is documented and routinely updated.

2.3 The organization has implemented measures of security risk compliance consistent with the HIPAA Security Rule, HITECH Meaningful Use Requirements, guidance of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, applicable accreditation standards and patient safety-related best practices to ensure that: (i) EHR system data or information is accessible and useable upon demand by an authorized person; (ii) EHR system data or information have not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner; and (iii) the EHR system employs currently available patient matching technology and capabilities to accurately match data to a particular patient consistent with commercially reasonable standards.

2.4 If the organization utilizes a cloud-based EHR, the disaster recovery plan addresses disruptions in access to an ISP or cloud-based EHR vendor to ensure the availability of the EHR for both treatment and billing services.

- The cloud-based EHR vendor provides a copy of its disaster recovery plan to the organization and agrees to perform disaster recovery testing involving one or more of the organization’s facilities, shares the results of such testing and promptly advises the organization of any changes in its disaster recovery plan.

- The cloud-based EHR vendor agreement includes specific contract provisions that address disaster recovery.

- The organization has negotiated the extent to which contractual language will excuse the cloud-based EHR vendor if a force majeure event occurs (e.g., language should be conditioned on the existence of execution of the vendor’s disaster recovery plan as required by other provisions of the contract).

ENDNOTES

1 The Joint Commission recognizes that technology may adversely affect the quality and safety of care if it is designed or implemented improperly or if user-technology interfaces are misinterpreted or subverted, and suggests approaches to the implementation of Health IT and “converging technologies”—the interrelationship between medical devices and Health IT—to minimize errors that may adversely affect patient care. See The Joint Commission Sentinel Event Alert No. 42: Safely implementing health information and converging technologies (December 11, 2008) available online at http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/18/SEA_42.pdf. See also The Joint Commission Sentinel Event Alert No. 54: Safe Use of Health Information Technology (March 31, 2015) available online at http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/18/SEA_54.pdf.

2 42 C.F.R. §482.12(a)(50) (The governing body must ensure that the medical staff is accountable to the governing body for the quality of care provided to patients.) Healthcare governing boards have a fiduciary obligation to oversee the quality of care and patient safety rendered within their institutions. This oversight obligation is based upon the application of the fiduciary duty of care board members owe the organization
and, for nonprofit organizations, the duty of obedience to charitable mission. In Caremark International Inc. v. Derivative Litigation, 698 A. 2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). Additionally, standards set by The Joint Commission reinforce the principle that a healthcare organization’s “governing body is ultimately accountable for the safety and quality of care, treatment, and services.” See The Joint Commission Hospital Accreditation Standards, Leadership (LD) Standards, LD.01.03.01, p. 101 (2009).

3 The Joint Commission (www.jointcommission.org), Healthcare Facilities Accreditation Program (www.fhap.org) and Det Norske Veritas Health, Inc. (www.dnv.com/industry/healthcare) all have deeming authority from CMS. Section 1865(a)(1) of the Social Security Act (the Act) permits providers and suppliers “accredited” by an approved national accreditation organization (AO) to be exempt from routine surveys by State survey agencies to determine compliance with Medicare conditions. Accreditation by an AO is voluntary and is not required for Medicare certification. Section 1865(a)(1) of the Act provides that if the Secretary finds that accreditation of a provider entity by a national accreditation body demonstrates that all applicable conditions are met or exceeded, the Secretary deems those requirements to be met by the provider or supplier. Other accrediting bodies include COLA (clinical laboratory accreditation) (www.cola.org), CARF International (rehabilitation facilities) (www.carf.org), American College of Radiology (diagnostic imaging accreditation) (www.acr.org) and Intersocietal Accreditation Commission (specialty imaging accreditation) (www.intersocietal.org). See also The Joint Commission Sentinel Event Alert No. 54: Safe Use of Health Information Technology (March 31, 2015) available online at http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/18/SEA_54.pdf.

4 See the Institute of Medicine recommendation on coordination of efforts to increase our understanding of risks associated with Health IT and improve its safe design, implementation, and see IOM (Institute of Medicine). Health IT and Patient Safety: Building Safer Systems for Better Care. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press; 2012.


8 See discussion in EHR Contracts: Key Contract Terms for Users to Understand, prepared by Westat for the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (June 25, 2013) available online at https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/ehr_contracting_terms_final_508_compliant.pdf.

9 See 45 CFR § 164.308(a).

10 The HITECH Meaningful Use requirements include a requirement for conducting a security risk analysis and implementing security updates as necessary and correcting identified security deficiencies. EHR technology certification criteria include the criteria found at 45 C.F.R. § 170.302(p) - Emergency Access. Certified EHR technology must “be capable of permitting authorized users to access electronic health information during an emergency.” See the HITECH Act § 4101(a), amending SSA § 1848, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(a) (Feb. 17, 2009). Title XIII of Division A and Title IV of Division B of the ARRA are commonly referred to as the “Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act.”


12 See 45 CFR § 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(B). See also The Joint Commission Standard IM.2.20 (IM.02.01.03*) requires the safeguarding of data and information against loss, destruction, and tampering.

13 See 45 CFR § 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(C).

14 See 45 CFR § 164.312(a)(2)(ii). See also The Joint Commission Standard IM.2.30 (IM.01.01.03*) requires a disaster recovery plan for information systems and the periodic testing of the plan to ensure its effectiveness.

Appendix J: Comments Received on the Draft Report

Conceptual Framework

Alliance for Nursing Informatics
Judy Murphy

The Alliance for Nursing Informatics (ANI) advances nursing informatics leadership, practice, education, policy and research through a unified voice of nursing informatics organizations. ANI has collaborated with American Nurses Association (ANA) to review the National Quality Forum (NQF) HIT and Patient Safety Project draft report: Identification and Prioritization of Health IT Patient Safety Measures. In that spirit we offer our comments for each section, as nursing stakeholders.

ANI is pleased that the project committee includes a diverse representation of multi-stakeholder experts to inform the draft report. We encourage the committee to actively expand their stakeholder representation and engage with patients as stakeholders to define and validate measures that are important to patients.

ANI supports the proposed framework and associated recommendations from the Committee that the report “should be viewed as a living document that will itself continue to evolve as evidence, practices, and technologies mature”.

ANI supports the position statement from American Nursing Informatics Association (ANIA), Addressing the Safety of Electronic Health Records (October, 2015), advocating evidence-based practices to support safe use of EHRs, development of an EHR safety program, and enhancing incident reporting systems with standardized terms, ease of reporting, and follow up for EHRs related events.

ANI appreciates the opportunity to contribute to the conversation on the Identification and Prioritization of Health IT Patient Safety Measures. Please feel free to contact us at any time for further discussion of the comments offered herein.

>Committee Response:
Thank you for your comments and for your support of this Committee’s work.

Electronic Health Record Association
Angela Gorden

We recognize that Table 1 on page eleven is taken largely from the cited works of Drs. Singh and Sittig, but since the report states that the NQF HIT Safety Committee “… determined that a variation of the model …” is what they would work with, we point out that what Table 1 labels as “levels” should not be considered levels. For instance, “Use of HIT to Improve Patient Safety” is categorized as “Level 3” when it should absolutely be a Level 1 factor. We suggest changing the term “level” to “category”, and thus recognizing that the items in each category are not necessarily dependent on achievement of previous categories.

In the description of Level 2 in the same table, what is “correct HIT use”? Some health IT features and functions are user-configurable and some are not. “Correct” use may or may not be “as intended”, given varying workflows and preferences among different end-users of the same product. Correctness may be impossible to define or measure.

In the description of Level 3 in this table, what is “safe … patient engagement”? This reference was not clear to the EHRA reviewers. We suggest “HIT enables effective patient engagement to enhance safety.” Health IT is the enabler, not the driver; process and culture are the drivers. So, it is health IT in combination with patient engagement that enhances safety.

On page 13, the report comments that many organizations often do not have the expertise needed to conduct investigation of health IT-related patient safety incidents (e.g., informatics, human factors, ergonomics). We believe that this lack of expertise may not be the largest factor in failure to do proper
investigation and analysis. We suggest culture may be at least an equally important factor. We suggest amended language: “However, many organizations have not developed the culture of safety which might be as important as having expertise.”

>Committee Response:
Thank you for your comments; the report has been modified to reflect suggested edits where appropriate.

The Committee agrees that “correct” use may be defined differently in different instances, and that measures intended to address the correct use of HIT should specify what is meant by that term for the purposes of those particular measures.

With regard to the language on p. 13 of the report, please note that this section reflects the Common Formats Expert Panel’s input to the HIT Safety Committee, so amending the language of the report would be inappropriate in this instance.

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Partners eCare
Charles Lagor

This report provides a comprehensive framework for the assessment of HIT safety measurement efforts, which is an important tool for healthcare organizations. Although it is clear that the framework is meant to provide guidance as opposed to prescribing steps, we believe that some of the recommendations are too generic. For example, “Vendors should involve end users in the design and development of HIT systems” (concept 15) leaves room for much interpretation. Consider two EHR vendors, A and B, who develop a user interface. The interface from vendor A was created in an ad-hoc fashion by a team of programmers and then “validated” by asking a few customers for their feedback during scheduled web-demos. The interface from vendor B was designed according to published best practices by an interdisciplinary team of engineers and psychologists and then validated through a number of experiments with end-users. In both cases, vendors A and B would have fulfilled the concept; however, vendor B clearly has a more thoroughly vetted interface than vendor A. The committee might consider making some recommendations more specific.

>Committee Response:
Thank you for your comments; your input has been noted in the final report. Please note that the potential measure concepts identified by Committee members are intended to highlight high-priority areas for measurement and to serve as guidance for future measure development; should these concepts be pursued further and developed into fully-specified measures, the Committee agrees that the commenter’s concerns should be considered and addressed as part of the measure development process.

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University of Florida Health Science Center
Robert Wears

The framework is limited by its focus on after-the-fact measurement of IT safety events. This means that an event must occur and be detected before it can even come to attention.

There is a desperate need for a more pro-active approach to assessing the safety of these systems prior to experiencing a safety event. An example of one approach is contained in ISO/TS 29231 and ISO/TS 29322.

>Committee Response:
Thank you for your comment. The Committee’s findings and recommendations focus on both prevention of HIT-related safety events as well as identification of those events as or after they occur. The potential measure concepts identified by the Committee reflect structures, processes, and outcomes related to HIT safety; the Committee notes that each of these types of measure can and should be used as part of quality and safety improvement efforts.
Environmental Scan

Alliance for Nursing Informatics
Judy Murphy

Overall, the environmental scan effectively describes the knowledge in the literature. We have provided specific comments identifying additional salient publications for inclusion. There is a lack of literature on the lack of knowledge transfer occurring across organizations related to EHR system configuration decisions; presentations at the AMIA Annual Conference 2015 emphasized this issue. Organizations procuring and implementing a new HIT system should be supported in full access to lessons learned related to patient safety risks from other organizations that have implemented the same EHR system. The notion of a nationwide HIT-related patient safety surveillance system should be aligned with these types of knowledge transfers.

The three phases of HIT safety outlined are sound. However, we disagree that new or recent adopters should only focus on Phase 1 concerns. Phase 2 - Using HIT Safely - is critical for new or recent adopters of HIT, and health care organizations full support for front line nurses and other clinicians in the safe use of HIT should not be delayed during implementation and adoption phases.

We support the use of the proposed Three-Level HIT Quality and Safety Improvement Model (Table 1) and suggest additional enhancements.

For Level 1: An essential component of data integrity is the provenance of data within a system, and when imported/exchanged from external systems, including patient generated health data, patient reported outcomes and remote patient monitoring. We propose that Data Integrity includes accessibility to metadata describing the provenance of the data and should be identified as an additional Prioritized Measurement Area.

For Level 2: Add new category, System Interoperability, aligning definition to the HHS/ONC Nationwide Interoperability Roadmap and to Key Areas for Measurement, Section 2

For Level 3. In addition to improving end-user satisfaction, EHR systems should not increase cognitive burden to the users and the distributed care team. In fact, aligned with Level 3, EHRs designed using usability principles and methods should result in decreased cognitive burden and harm composite.

Best practices related to Governance for HIT are emerging. Please see the ANI endorsed project and 2015 JAMIA publication by Collins et al, Nursing domain of CI governance: recommendations for health IT adoption and optimization.

Patient portals should be required to comply with the same principles of each prior level, particularly data completeness. Patient portals that silo data across settings of care increase risk for safety errors within and across encounters.

>Committee Response:
Thank you for your comments. The Committee agrees with your thoughts on the importance of data integrity, system interoperability, and the need to reduce cognitive burden, and believes that these issues are represented in the current framework and prioritized measurement areas. However, your additional thoughts and input has been noted in the final report.

Electronic Health Record Association
Angela Gorden

On page seven in the “HIT Design” sub-section, we suggest adding the word “may” to the first sentence regarding what is included in the design of health IT.

In the following paragraph on the same page regarding health IT implementation, the EHRA compliments the NQF HIT Safety Committee report for recognizing the importance of adequate planning, workflow redesign, and staff education/training in the implementation process.

We disagree that the three-phase framework for the development of EHR-specific patient safety goals on page nine are chronological phases. Implementers could be working in all three “phases” concurrently from the outset - i.e., using health IT to improve
quality and safety is something that is expected from the first day of implementation.

On page 10, in categorizing types of HIT-related safety concerns, the EHRA finds that there is still a narrow focus on system components and single actors, rather than on the broader “cultural” aspects of HIT safety, despite the earlier discussion in the “Role of Human Factors in HIT Safety” sub-section.

Although we very much respect the work of Drs. Singh and Sittig, we point out that this categorization is still a conceptual model. In an evidence-based learning system, the model must be corroborated by other researchers and implementers and supported by empirical evidence. We do not oppose proceeding based on this as a conceptual model, but future work will need more specificity in defining issues and describing exactly what is being measured. Most of that work would need to happen later during development of the actual measures.

>**Committee Response:**
Thank you for your comments; the report has been modified to reflect suggested edits where appropriate.

Regarding the description of the EHR-specific patient safety goals and the categorization of HIT-related safety concerns, please note that these items are part of a summary of information identified through the environmental scan, not findings of the HIT Safety Committee.

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**University of Florida Health Science Center**

**Robert Wears**

Searching the medical literature will not give a full picture of IT related risks. The search should be supplemented with a review of the safety science and computer science literature. It doesn’t even seem that the search found the 2007 National Research Council report on software for dependable systems.

>**Committee Response:**
Thank you for your comment. Your concerns regarding the scope and reach of the environmental scan has been noted in the final report.

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**AHIMA**

**Lynne Thomas Gordon**

Patient Identification

Accurate and reliable patient identification continues to be a major concern related to HIT safety. A number of our members have noted that patient matching errors often begin at registration and can generate a cascade of errors that continue until a patient is discharged. A recent survey of AHIMA members revealed that over half of HIM professionals routinely work on mitigating possible patient record duplicates at their facility. Of those, 72 percent work to mitigate duplicate records on a weekly basis.[1]

We agree with HIT Safety committee members that accountability for patient identification should be shared across stakeholders. HIM professionals could play an important role in ensuring that staff is properly trained in identifying the correct patient and that patients are educated about the importance of patient identification at the point of registration.

We also support the inclusion of the AHIMA measures mentioned in this report. These simple, best-practice, standardized formula(s) could serve as a sound basis for determining duplication rates at the facility level and/or enterprise level. That said, we acknowledge that different methods and algorithms are currently used to measure duplication.
rates, resulting in various EHR vendor systems yielding different patient matching errors. Therefore, we recommend that to properly measure patient identification, there should be consistency in the measurement tools used in evaluating the number of duplicate patients as well as consistency in the ability to measure the frequency of such duplicates.


Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the National Quality Forum’s (NQF) draft report, Identification and Prioritization of Health IT Patient Safety Measures.

Although the report covers a number of topics, we have focused our comments below on seven specific measurement areas that are critical to improving the safety of health information technology (HIT) and patient safety.

Clinical Decision Support

Poorly designed or improperly configured clinical decision support (CDS) can be disruptive to care and potentially threaten patient safety. Our members have expressed concerns not only about “alert fatigue” but have cited instances of inappropriate alert overrides that in turn can jeopardize patient safety. Periodic training, education, and measurement of user competency can play an important role in ensuring that clinicians are using CDS as it is intended to realize the full potential of HIT to improve the safety and effectiveness of patient care.

System Interoperability

System interoperability is crucial to ensuring that the right information is provided to the right person at the right time in the proper context. However, as NQF’s HIT Safety committee notes in this report, many electronic health records (EHRs) today are not interoperable within and across health systems—leading to delays in treatment or wrong patient/ wrong procedure problems. We believe that any measurement in this area that assesses whether systems are exchanging information should ensure that there is a consistent understanding among stakeholders in what data is in fact being exchanged and that the data be actionable. In other words, to properly measure system interoperability, there needs to be some degree of standardization of terminologies to ensure that the data exchanged is meaningful, consistently interpreted and vital to patient care.

User-Centered Design and Use of Testing, Evaluation, and Simulation to Promote Safety across the HIT Lifecycle

User-centered design is critical for safe and effective HIT. A number of our members have expressed concerns that EHR systems, particularly in the context of medication reconciliation, do not accurately reflect workflows, resulting in workarounds that heighten the risk to patient safety.

EHR vendor testing to assess the usability of a system should be considered as a critical measure concept in this area. That said, any testing performed should also include the testing of any upgrades or “fixes” to the system to ensure that potential challenges or problems that may arise are identified before the upgrade is implemented.

We also support end user involvement throughout the lifecycle of HIT as a potential measure concept in this area. Our members have expressed concerns that often times there is no “cradle to grave” testing throughout the lifecycle of the system. Participation by the end user in the design and development through implementation, use, and evaluation could help identify potential HIT-related safety risks or problems at the outset.

Finally, we agree with HIT Safety committee members that user-centered and organization/system-centered simulation should be considered as a measure concept in this area. End user competency is vital to improving patient safety. Measuring user-centered and organization/system-centered simulation could help ensure that users are adequately trained on how to use the system, particularly as HIT is rapidly evolving. That said, any development of simulation and training programs should ensure that the simulation program is updated to match the “live” system to ensure that the end user is sufficiently trained.

Feedback and Information Sharing

We agree with the HIT Safety committee members’
concerns that vendor contracts often contain broad non-disclosure and confidentiality provisions as well as intellectual property protections that prevent certain EHR software information from being publically shared. Prohibiting timely information exchange not only hinders the safe and effective use of HIT but prevents institutions and clinicians from mitigating errors that have occurred in similar settings.

An appropriate measurement in this area should include requirements of information sharing in software license and hardware purchase agreements and contracts. Another potential measure concept could include whether such agreements and contracts specify that system issues will be fixed or resolved in a timely manner and not delayed until the next system release. Delaying such updates or “fixes” can often result in manual workarounds that can paralyze a health system and jeopardize patient safety.

Use of HIT to Facilitate Timely and High-Quality Documentation

Timely capture and transmission of high-quality clinical information is critical to ensuring patient safety. The use of structured or designated fields can play a vital role in sharing information across systems as patients transition across various care settings by enhancing the information that is exchanged and interpreted across systems. That said, while we believe the use of structured data should be encouraged whenever possible, there is still a need to maintain free text and not replace all free text fields with structured data. Patients and their situations are not always the same—should the data become too structured, clinicians may lose the value of prose in a patient’s story—leading to inaccurate information in the patient’s record and potentially endangering patient safety. In addition, we recommend that should the use of structured fields versus free text for documentation of active problems be addressed in the short term, it is critical to clearly define the structured data fields to ensure that any selections made by clinicians in the respective fields are accurate and consistently interpreted by whoever uses it.

Patient Engagement

Patient engagement is emerging as an important area for HIT safety. However, it is important to note that in addition to some of the concerns cited by HIT Safety committee members in the draft report, certain limitations and the variable functionality of patient portals by different EHR vendors presents a challenge. In other words, whether certain document(s) can be accessed through a patient portal often varies depending on the EHR vendor. Consequently, while some flexibility is needed in this area, further standardization of functionalities may be required in order to engage in effective comparative data analysis of patient engagement.

We thank you for the opportunity to submit comments on the draft report Identification and Prioritization of Health IT Patient Safety Measures. We look forward to working with NQF to further enhance HIT safety.

>Committee Response:

Thank you for your comments; your input has been noted in the final report.

Alliance for Nursing Informatics

Judy Murphy

We concur that Clinical Decision Support (CDS) is a high priority area. Yet, the examples used are narrow in scope, ignoring critical nursing and patient decision making. The notion that risk-based CDS applications are “still somewhat aspirational goals” overlooks substantial work related to risk/guideline based CDS such as Dykes et al’s Fall-TIPS work and Bowles et al’s readmission reduction.

System Interoperability is a major safety concern. The lack of codified data (particularly nursing) results in data silos and redundancy. Learned workarounds to accommodate systems lacking true, bi-directional interoperability are a hindrance to safely using HIT and result in incomplete/inaccurate data driving patient care and CDS. We encourage expanding the scope to receiving data from external systems and data validation. We propose a metric for prevention of inaccurate data transmission to ensure information sent and received is consistently correct.

We applaud the thoughtful discussion on user-centered design and agree accountability should be shared between vendors and organizations. We support focusing on high risk scenarios given
the feasibility of simulation/training programs. We strongly recommend user-centered design include patients. We recommend the vendor or organization be measured by the extent of patient involvement in the HIT lifecycle and point to the Medstar Health EHR User-Centered Design Evaluation Framework.

>Committee Response:
Thank you for your comments; your thoughts, input, and concerns has been noted in the final report.

Alliance for Nursing Informatics
Judy Murphy
We strongly agree ‘lessons learned’ be shared across the user community. We agree contract terms should not be broader than reasonably necessary and should align with the idea that sharing patient safety knowledge is necessary for quality improvement. Transparency of such data is needed to further nursing research across the phases of the HIT lifecycle.

Timely and high-quality documentation should measure critical points of interprofessional care planning (e.g., rounds). “Good” clinical documentation should be defined and include a proxy measure (e.g., frequency of note views). Metric implementation must prevent increased documentation requirements that are not based on sound safety evidence. Measures should focus on technical solutions such as full integration of devices to allow nurses to function at their highest level of practice, not performing data entry. We encourage stronger emphasis on medication reconciliation given error rates and lack of maturity of the market place.

We concur that patients’ ability to engage in their health and care through technology, is an emerging area for HIT safety and highly prioritized. Patient portals and integration across settings (inpatient, outpatient, retail) is a critical use case. Yet, critical use cases extend beyond the portal, including mHealth, teleHealth, remote monitoring, and clinical trials. Each activity may use separate tools with unique safety and interoperability issues. We encourage review of work by Batalden et.al, 2015 framing a model of healthcare service co-production and HIT safety implications, and the LIBRETTO Consortium exploring best practices for acute care patient portals. We encourage harmonization with measures for Meaningful Use Stage 2 and 3 and the addition of Patient Portals, mHealth, Telemedicine tools as data sources for measurement. The following metrics should also include Patient Portals: a) percent of patients who suggest corrections to EHR information and b) ability to access and annotate the EHR, c) frequency of access and annotation.

>Committee Response:
Thank you for your comments; your thoughts, input, and suggestions has been noted in the final report.

American Academy of Neurology
Amy Bennett
Thank you for the opportunity to comment. The AAN agrees these goals sound reasonable. However, it appears the lack of proposed measures in certain areas is due to the fact these areas are difficult to measure, not due to lack of importance. Current Meaningful Use (MU) requirements cover Clinical Decision Support and System Interoperability (in a limited way), User-Centered Design and Use ... (if you consider medication reconciliation as safety), Patient Engagement, and HIT-Focused Risk-Management Infrastructure (if you consider the security audit); other MU measures indirectly touch on the key measurement areas. HIT-Focused Risk-Management Infrastructure is vague. Additionally, there may be benefit to call out Computerized Provider Order Entry separately from Clinical Decision Support.

>Committee Response:
Thank you for your comment. The Committee agrees that there is some overlap between the measure concepts identified and ongoing efforts such as Meaningful Use requirements; the Committee notes that developers should carefully consider the evolving regulatory, accreditation, and certification landscape as they generate new ideas and concepts for quality measures.

American Nursing Informatics Association
Patricia Sengstack
The American Nursing Informatics Association (ANIA) supports the final list of nine key measurement areas and believes these are the main areas of focus for health IT safety. The challenge
going forward will be to take these concepts or areas of focus and provide granular enough detail in the measures to allow organizations to apply them in their practice settings with some level of standardization. The tables included with each of the nine areas of focus begin to address this but more detail will be needed. Additionally, it will be helpful to relate the nine measurement areas to the Three-Level HIT Quality and Safety Improvement Model. If the purpose of the conceptual model is to serve as a way to categorize and conceptualize potential measurement concepts and gaps in the area of HIT safety, then the nine areas of focus should fall into one of the three categories. Perhaps the appropriate level (1, 2 or 3) could be included in each table description of the key measure. Organizations may want to develop their HIT safety programs ensuring that they cover at least one key measure in each of the three levels of the model. Thank you for the opportunity to comment.

>Committee Response:

Thank you for your comments; your thoughts, input, and suggestions has been noted in the final report.

Consumers Union/Consumer Reports

Dena Mendelsohn

Regarding the patient engagement priority area, Consumers Union agrees that patient engagement is important both for improved health outcomes and for patient safety. Currently, many consumers have access to patient portals, but those portals are limited in navigability and content—those who make their way onto their patient portals and attempt to find comprehensive health records are stymied. For true patient engagement, patient portals should provide health records in fully transparent, non-annotated or summarized, health records. We therefore agree with the statement, “[p]articularly with the promulgation of patient portals, the usability, usefulness, and use of these portals should be a focus of quality measurement.” It is our hope that with added attention to the content of patient portals—rather than simply whether a portal exists—meaningful patient engagement will improve and, with that, so too patient safety and health outcomes.

Regarding the patient identification priority area, Consumers Union agree with the statement that “identifying the right patient is one of the most important components to patient safety, and that errors in this area have the potential to cause catastrophic events.” To that end, we particularly agree that patients should play a key role in identifying patient identification errors. That said, at this point, the extent to which patients can check for identification errors is limited to the extent that they can access their records at all. We therefore support inclusion of patients in this step but encourage more complete and transparent patient portals so patients can play a larger role in ensuring their safety.

>Committee Response:

Thank you for your comment; your input has been noted in the final version of the report.

Johns Hopkins

Harold Lehmann

Great foci of measurement.

It struck me that the “conceptual” measures should be associated with small graphics showing each block’s conceptual model----this way, we can see what might have been left out, what is being measured because it can be measured (as surrogate for something else), and to “sell the product” better. (One picture is easier to grok than a list of bullet points.) The model may also help when it comes time to turn the “concepts” into numerators and denominators.

>Committee Response:

Thank you for your comment; the Committee appreciates your thoughtful feedback on the report and its presentation. Given the limited timeframe for finalizing this report, the suggested re-conceptualization of the prioritized measurement areas will not be feasible, but NQF will take these comments into consideration for subsequent projects and reports.

Partners eCare

Charles Lagor

To supplement concepts 72 (alert rate) and 74 (false positive alert rate) we would suggest adding the expected alert rate (as % of total patients). The rational is to identify a potential under-firing (i.e.
when the actual alert rate is lower than the expected alert rate). The entity responsible for this measure is the facility and the framework domain is “2C - Complete/Correct Health IT Use.”

**Committee Response:**
Thank you for your comments; your input has been noted in the final report. Please note that the potential measure concepts identified by Committee members are intended to highlight high-priority areas for measurement and to serve as guidance for future measure development; should these concepts be pursued further and developed into fully-specified measures, the Committee agrees that the commenter’s concerns should be considered and addressed as part of the measure development process.

**Wolters Kluwer Health**
**Bob Hussey**
The proposed measure concepts for Clinical Decision Support appear heavily skewed towards alerts. CMS recognizes a broad range of permissible CDS interventions for Meaningful Use compliance, including Infobuttons, condition-specific order sets and diagnostic support. We believe the report’s section on CDS should be more balanced to include measure concepts that track interventions other than alerts.

Regarding the measures involving CDS alerts, we are concerned with the utility and objectivity of several of the concepts, including the percent of alerts that occur at the right time, and instances of inappropriate alert overrides. What constitutes the “right time” for an alert is subjective, and therefore difficult to track with an objective quality measure. Similarly, whether an overridden alert is the direct or proximate cause of patient harm (and therefore ‘inappropriate’), particularly after significant time has passed, will also be difficult to measure given the myriad of factors that may contribute to a patient’s health condition. Finally, we fail to see the utility of a measure that tracks ‘alert rate.’ A more meaningful alert-related metric is the rate of alert overrides, without attempting to gauge their appropriateness. The report proposes to include such a measure under the ‘HIT-focused Risk-Management Infrastructure’ section, but we believe it should be moved to the ‘Clinical Decision Support’ section and replace the more problematic alert-related measure concepts cited above.

**Committee Response:**
Thank you for your comments; your input has been noted in the final report. The Committee agrees that there may be challenges associated with measurement in this area, as with every area identified in the report. The Committee also agrees that clinical decision support (CDS) is not synonymous with alert-related issues; however, Committee members determined that, for the purpose of identifying priority areas of measurement, alert-related issues would best be categorized within the broader topic of CDS.

**Wolters Kluwer Health**
**Bob Hussey**
We strongly agree with the need to ensure CDS content is based on evidence and free from errors, but given the sheer volume and ever-changing nature of such content, we do not believe ongoing monitoring is practical or feasible. An alternative approach is to develop quality standards for the content creation process that result in consistently accurate and timely CDS. Specifically, a rigorous, transparent editorial process should be employed, using authors who are trained health care professionals with experience treating patients and interpreting scientific data and research results. CDS content should be reviewed for accuracy at least monthly and updated as new evidence dictates. Finally, the authors and the process used to create the content should be transparent to the end-user. Note that CMS has already adopted many of these content development standards for the new rules related to Appropriate Use Criteria for Imaging.

**Committee Response:**
As an alternative to monitoring CDS content, consider approach of developing develop quality standards for the content creation process that result in consistently accurate and timely CDS.

**Wolters Kluwer Health**
**Bob Hussey**
We agree timely clinical documentation is vitally
important and wholeheartedly support a measure on the percent of charts that capture allergies in free text rather than in structured or designated fields. We have long advocated the superiority of structured data for documentation, which is more accurate than free text and more easily exchanged between providers. On another measure concept in the documentation section, medication reconciliation, we question the need for such a measure since this is already part of the clinical information reconciliation requirement in meaningful use.

We also support the development of measures based on SAFER Guides, including the availability of evidence-based order sets in the EHR for common tasks/conditions, and the minimal use of free text order entry when orders can be entered and stored using structured formats. The SAFER Guides also could serve as the foundation for several new drug therapy-related CDS measures, including duplicate order checking for high-risk medications, dose range checking and drug-patient age checking.

There are a number of measure concepts related to CDS and HIT Documentation that were listed in the report’s appendix but not included among the recommended list. We believe several are worthy of ongoing consideration, including: advanced decision support for geriatric and/or renal dosing; the presence of order sets for the most common admission diagnoses; free text charting when there is a coded item available (which we interpret to mean that the patient’s chart is updated using free text despite the availability of a structured data option); and the use of bar codes in medication preparation. All four will lead to improved patient safety and fewer provider errors, and should be included in the final report.

On behalf of my client, Wolters Kluwer Health, we appreciate NQF’s willingness to entertain comments on the HIT Patient Safety Draft Report. Please feel free to contact Bob Hussey if there are follow up questions related to any of our comments. Thanks.

>Committee Response:
Thank you for your comments; your input has been noted in the final version of the report.

General Comments

University of Missouri
Pamela Ostby
Very thorough and well crafted report that represents extensive research and work by the authors. A couple points:

We really needed one product to be used universally for the EHR, but since this was not done, perhaps future applications could have universal interface capability?

Even within systems, there is interoperability/interface problems (i.e. different system used by ER that doesn’t interface with hospital).

Overarching issue #4: Clinicians are entering data to satisfy ever-increasing requirements by accreditation organizations, rather than meaningful direct patient-care related items. Errors/events are occurring due to the lack of attention given to the real patient.

Similar to care paths established several years ago, perhaps the clinician could choose the “path” matched for the diagnosis and add any variables, rather painstakingly going through every choice for all patients. Just a thought and product related; however, there has to be a better way.

The interface with mobile entities that provide care in underserved areas or those with little access needs to be included.

>Committee Response:
Thank you for your comment; your input has been noted in the final version of the report.

Alliance for Nursing Informatics
Judy Murphy
In regards to the Overarching Issues that were identified in the report, ANI offers the following comments pertaining to 1, 2, 4 and 8:

1. HIT quality and safety should be a shared responsibility of clinicians, healthcare organizations, vendors, and in some instances, patients.

According to a recommendation cited in Mastering
The culture that we should adopt is one that thinks nationally but acts locally. Our federal government and professional organizations cannot improve health IT safety without the expertise of informatics specialists. It will take each organization working in partnership with the government, health IT vendors, and PSOs to drive improvements in patient safety using health IT” (Sengstack, P., 2015, page 314).

2. Many if not most HIT Safety issues require attention and solutions across the full HIT lifecycle.

ANA Nursing Informatics: Scope and Standards of Practice (2nd Edition) states, “Informatics nurses have multiple opportunities to assist in ensuring the safety and security of health-related IT products that support clinicians, as well as patients, families, and other caregivers. The implementation of electronic health records without regard to workflow, analysis and redesign, human-computer interaction, prevention of errors in medication administration, and prevention of possible missed diagnosis have increased the concern for patient safety” (ANA, 2015, page 34).

4. The increased data burden for clinicians and other staff needs to be considered as one of the most important, broad unintended consequences of HIT.

Nurses are the largest users of EHRs and ANI supports the Big Data in Nursing: Top 10 Recommendations developed by the HIMSS CNO-CNIO Vendor Roundtable, “Healthcare organizations should utilize nurse informaticists who will provide valuable insights into concept representation, design, implementation and optimization of health IT to support evidence-based practice, research and education.” The Report of the AMIA EHR 2020 Task Force on the Status and Future Direction of EHRs, also recommends we “simplify and speed documentation” (Payne, T.H., et al., JAMIA, 2015, Page 2).

8. Many HIT safety issues are being addressed in other programs or initiatives and should be considered as measure developers work to develop new metrics in this area.

ANI supports the position statement from American Nursing Informatics Association (ANIA), Addressing the Safety of Electronic Health Records (October, 2015), advocating evidence-based practices to support safe use of EHRs, development of an EHR safety program, and enhancing incident reporting systems with standardized terms, ease of reporting, and follow up for EHRs related events.

>Committee Response:
Thank you for your comments; your thoughts, input, and suggestions has been noted in the final report.

American Nursing Informatics Association
Patricia Sengstack

The American Nursing Informatics Association (ANIA) supports this draft of the Identification and Prioritization of Health IT Patient Safety Measures. It aligns with ANIA’s recently published Position Statement “Addressing the Safety of Electronic Health Records” (https://www.ania.org/about-us/position-statements/addressing-safety-electronic-health-records ). We noted that NQF uses the acronym “HIT” throughout its document while the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) uses the term “Health IT” in its documentation. We wondered if there should be consistency. More nurses on the HIT Safety Committee would also be recommended. ANIA would be happy to help with this if requested. Thank you again for the opportunity to comment.

>Committee Response:
Thank you for your comments; your input has been noted in the final report. Please note that NQF holds open calls for nominations for all Committees and Expert Panels, and posts Committee and Expert Panel rosters for public comment when they are initially seated; we would welcome your input on additional nominations as well as the experience and expertise represented on Committees for future NQF projects.

Electronic Health Record Association
Angela Gorden

On behalf of more than 30 member companies of the Electronic Health Record Association (EHRA), we submit the following comments on the Draft Report: Identification and Prioritization of Health IT Patient Safety Measures which was published in November 2015. Individuals who work on the EHRA’s
Patient Safety Workgroup represent EHR developer organizations that serve the majority of hospitals and ambulatory organizations across the US that are actively using EHRs to provide more effective and efficient care to their patients. Our collective experiences in working with these organizations are reflected in these comments as we attempt to provide practical advice on the complex topic of health IT and its potential impacts on patient safety. These comments follow the flow of the report so are not necessarily in priority order.

Generally speaking, EHRA reviewers found that while the draft report makes many valid points, there are some areas where the recommendations do not seem to reflect practical experience. Because of time constraints, the EHRA is unable to provide as detailed a level of comments as we would like and we would welcome the opportunity to provide more comprehensive feedback at a later date. Given the upcoming deadline for submission of comments, we are offering the following high-level input through our letter sent via email, due to space limitation in this form.

>Committee Response:
Thank you for your comments; your input has been noted in the final report.

Pharmacy HIT Collaborative
Shelly Spiro
On behalf of the membership of the Pharmacy Health Information Technology Collaborative (Collaborative), we are pleased to submit comments on the Identification and Prioritization of Health IT Patient Safety Measures Draft Report.

The Collaborative is supportive of the draft report and suggested recommendations for the list of measure concepts considered for prioritization, which should help identify risks and HIT-related safety concerns. We agree that with proper design, implementation, and use, HIT will enhance the ability to reduce medical errors and improve quality of care.

The Collaborative also appreciates the National Quality Forum developing this report. In addition to the measurement recommendations, the report provides useful, details of activities undertaken to move HIT forward, decisions made, and explanations of those activities and decisions.

Since 2010, the Collaborative has worked progressively with the agencies involved in developing and improving the national health IT framework.

The Pharmacy HIT Collaborative’s vision and mission are to assure the nation’s health care system is supported by meaningful use of HIT, the integration of pharmacists for the provision of quality patient care, and to advocate and educate key stakeholders regarding the meaningful use of HIT and the inclusion of pharmacists within a technology-enabled integrated health care system. The Collaborative was formed in the fall of 2010 by nine pharmacy professional associations, representing 250,000 members, and also includes associate members from other pharmacy-related organizations. The Pharmacy HIT Collaborative’s founding organizations represent pharmacists in all patient care settings and other facets of pharmacy, including pharmacy education and pharmacy education accreditation. The Collaborative’s Associate Members represent e-prescribing and health information networks, a standards development organization, transaction processing networks, pharmacy companies, system vendors and other organizations that support pharmacists’ services.

>Committee Response:
Thank you for your comments and for your support of this Committee’s work.

University of Florida Health Science Center
Robert Wears
There is no one on the committee with credentials in safety critical computing or IT safety. This seems a major oversight, and leaves the committee without important expertise and experience.

>Committee Response:
Thank you for your comment. Your concerns regarding the makeup of the HIT Safety Committee has been noted in the final report. Please note that NQF holds open calls for nominations for all Committees and Expert Panels, and posts Committee and Expert Panel rosters for public comment when they are initially seated; we would welcome your input on additional nominations as well as the
experience and expertise represented on Committees for future NQF projects.

University of Florida Health Science Center
Robert Wears
A classification scheme for safety risks in health IT has already been developed. See ISO/TS 25238

>Committee Response:
Thank you for your comment. Your concerns regarding the scope and reach of the environmental scan has been noted in the final report.
January 11, 2016

Members of the NQF HIT Safety Committee
National Quality Forum
1030 15th Street NW
Suite 800
Washington, DC 20005

Re: Identification and Prioritization of Health IT Patient Safety Measures Draft Report

Ms. Belmont, Dr. Singh and the NQF HIT Safety Committee:

The American Medical Informatics Association (AMIA) writes to express our strong support for the draft report, “Identification and Prioritization of Health IT Patient Safety Measures,” and the development of reportable measures meant to identify the nature, scope and prevalence of health information technology-related safety issues. AMIA has long-advocated for greater focus on the potential patient safety implications of health IT, and we believe this work contributes substantively to a growing corpus of knowledge on the safety and safe use of health IT.

AMIA is the professional home for more than 5,000 informatics professionals, representing researchers, front-line clinicians and public health experts who bring meaning to data, manage information and generate new knowledge across the health and healthcare enterprise. AMIA members play a leading role in advancing health and wellness by moving basic research findings from bench to bedside, and evaluating interventions, innovations and public policy across settings and patient populations.

The draft report identifies nine measurement areas for health IT safety and several measure concepts that could reflect performance in health IT safety. AMIA believes these measures, when fully developed, should serve as a foundation for future policy, and they should catalyze work among developers and providers alike to better prevent and/or mitigate health IT-related concerns. However, as noted in the Report of the AMIA EHR 2020 Task Force on the Status and Future Direction of EHRs, it is paramount that development of these measures be done in a way that minimizes additional collection burden on clinicians. We must ensure that the data collected for safety measures is done in a way similar to how we collect data for quality and value. There must be consistency in how the data is collected and common ways for representing the data in structured way, so that the same fundamental building blocks are used to construct measures using the same data. Our strained healthcare system cannot absorb another regime of performance measurement that is not a byproduct of routine data collection and care delivery.

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Health IT safety is a responsibility shared among developers, healthcare organizations, clinicians, patients and government stakeholders. Through the creation of a single body focused on health IT safety, empowered to collect information on, evaluate, and report on the overall safety of health IT, AMIA believes that event reporting, education, data aggregation, and the creation of best practices can improve patient safety, better engender patient engagement and fulfill the potential of health IT. To this end, AMIA calls on Congress to fully fund a collaborative, national center for health IT safety, as outlined in the recent Health IT Safety Center Roadmap. In conjunction with other initiatives, we urge lawmakers to use this work to inform ongoing conversations about how to ensure the safety and effectiveness of health IT functionality not considered a medical device.

Absent a regulatory regime developed by the FDA, we believe some other approach must be in place to ensure the safety and effectiveness of health IT. In April 2014, a risk-based approach was proposed by federal regulators, which helped catalyze conversations among stakeholders inside and outside government. In the nearly two years since its publication, the draft FDASIA Health IT Report joins other important ideas on how to ensure the safety and safe use of health IT. But now is the time to put such ideas into action. We request that regulators update and finalize their approach to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the software excluded from FDA regulation.

These measure concepts are an important component to the ongoing feedback loop needed to achieve a learning health system. If we are to improve the safety and safe use of health IT, there must be incentives – positive and negative – to focus efforts of a strained healthcare system.

Below we outline some specific recommendations in more detail. We hope our comments are helpful as you undertake this important work. Should you have questions about these comments or require additional information, please contact Jeffery Smith, Vice President of Public Policy at jsmith@amia.org or (301) 657-1291.

Sincerely,

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President and CEO  
AMIA

Thomas H. Payne, MD, FACP  
AMIA Board Chair  
Medical Director, IT Services, UW Medicine  
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Attached: Recommendations to Inform the NQF HIT Safety Committee Draft Report
Identification and Prioritization of Health IT Patient Safety Measures

General observations regarding the draft report

This draft report is timely given the broad deployment of EHRs and other health IT, and the growing appreciation for how complex social and technical interactions are in healthcare. The report leverages expertise cultivated over the last decade of health IT implementation, and is aligned with initiatives meant to better understand and better address health IT-related patient safety issues. Building on concepts developed by prominent health IT safety researchers, the measurement approach taken by the report is grounded in well-established sociotechnical models to account for the complex interactions in this space. The report builds on numerous others, including work done by the National Academy of Medicine (formerly the Institute of Medicine), the Joint Commission and the federal government.6

Additionally, this report is aligned with important initiatives underway in the private sector, such as the ECRI Institutes Partnership for Health IT Patient Safety7 and the Association for the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation (AAMI) HIT Standards Development Initiative.8 The Partnership is actively discovering new ways to identify and categorize patient safety events that may involve health IT, and AAMI is developing new process and risk management standards to improve how health IT is developed, implemented, tested, maintained and retired. In conjunction, these efforts will simultaneously illuminate the depth and breadth of health IT-related patient safety issues experienced in clinical settings across the country, and attempt to better prevent or mitigate harms.

Measurement priorities

We applaud the proposed NQF measurement framework because it addresses the entire spectrum of health IT-related patient safety issues and across the lifecycle of health IT, including safe development of IT, safe use of IT and the use of IT to improve patient safety. Using this framework, the draft report identifies nine measurement areas for health IT safety and several measure concepts that could reflect performance in those areas.

In the near-term, we recommend focusing on concepts and measures that can be implemented in a non-disruptive fashion, using data already collected. Specifically, NQF should prioritize measures related to clinical decision support (CDS), patient identification, HIT-focused risk-management infrastructure and system downtime. These areas represent categories of high importance, and offer measure developers an opportunity to work within the scope of data that is likely already captured.

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7 https://www.ecri.org/resource-center/Pages/HITPartnership.aspx
Next, we suggest NQF prioritize measures related to user-centered design, use of HIT to facilitate timely and high-quality documentation, patient engagement, and system interoperability. We note that these measure concepts will need further development, and should drive a research agenda that brings together developers, clinicians, researchers, standards developers and measure developers to:

- Identify component data and metadata;
- Assess which data is currently collected through normal workflows, care delivery and through organizational reporting processes;
- Develop standard definitions for the measures; and
- Create mechanisms to export the measures to that they can compare results across organizations.

In conjunction with promotion and wider adoption of ONC’s Safety Assurance Factors for EHR Resilience (SAFER) Guides, we believe it is important to make tangible progress towards the finalization of measure concepts, so that organizations can begin testing and reporting. However, experience with quality measurement and health IT “use” measurement tells us it is important to anticipate how the act of compiling and reporting these measures may influence behavior.

Similarly, we urge caution against lowering the evidence thresholds that guide NQF measure development in other domains. While we understand the importance of, and support the need for, advancement in the area of patient safety measurement, we believe it is premature to suggest any circumvention in the endorsement process is warranted, as described on page 33 of the report.

Finally, one area of discussion that may warrant explicit attention is diagnostic errors. As discussed in the recent report from the National Academy of Medicine, “Improving Diagnosis in Health Care,” diagnostic errors are so prevalent that “most people will experience at least one diagnostic error in their lifetime, sometimes with devastating consequences.” To address this “moral, professional and public health imperative,” to improve diagnosis, the report outlined goals to, “ensuring that health information technologies support patients and health care professionals in the diagnostic process,” and “develop and deploy approaches to identify, learn from, and reduce diagnostic errors and near misses in clinical practice.” We encourage this committee to consider developing specific measures in this realm so we can attempt to capture, categorize and improve the incidence of diagnostic errors, and begin to address this glaring problem.

Letter from Electronic Health Record Association (EHRA)

January 11, 2016

Andrew Lyzenga
Senior Project Manager, Performance Measurement
National Quality Forum
1030 15th Street NW Suite 800
Washington DC 20005

Dear Mr. Lyzenga:

On behalf of more than 30 member companies of the Electronic Health Record Association (EHRA), we submit the following comments on the Draft Report: Identification and Prioritization of Health IT Patient Safety Measures which was published in November 2015. Individuals who work on the EHRA’s Patient Safety Workgroup represent EHR developer organizations that serve the majority of hospitals and ambulatory organizations across the US that are actively using EHRs to provide more effective and efficient care to their patients. Our collective experiences in working with these organizations are reflected in these comments as we attempt to provide practical advice on the complex topic of health IT and its potential impacts on patient safety. These comments follow the flow of the report so are not necessarily in priority order.

Please note that the comments submitted online are truncated due to space limitations. This letter has our full and detailed comments.

Generally speaking, EHRA reviewers found that while the draft report makes many valid points, there are some areas where the recommendations do not seem to reflect practical experience. Because of time constraints, the EHRA is unable to provide as detailed a level of comments as we would like and we would welcome the opportunity to provide more comprehensive feedback at a later date. Given the upcoming deadline for submission of comments, we are offering the following high-level input.

• The report references a “multi-stakeholder committee” that was convened to provide input and direction on the development of a conceptual framework for analyzing measures of safety in health IT and to identify priority measurement areas with the greatest potential for both improving the safety of HIT and using HIT to improve patient safety. Please clarify that this is the same committee later referred to as “the HIT Safety Committee.” If so, references to this committee should be the same throughout the document.

• In some places, the report uses the term “framework”, and in other places the term “model” is used. Terminology should be consistent throughout, assuming these terms reference the same thing. It is also difficult to differentiate between when the framework/model is that adopted by the HIT Safety Committee and when framework/model refers to the content of the cited publications of Drs. Singh and Sittig. The report needs to more clearly differentiate these references.
• The report makes reference to “seamless interoperability” and patient records being “stored centrally” for easy access. We would point out that with truly seamless interoperability, the concept of central storage is not typically needed or desirable. In the same paragraph, there is an example of a patient in an emergency department where providers have “access to prior records through electronic health records (EHRs)”. We suggest you broaden that to “electronic health records or other data sources.”

• In the paragraph on page four that suggests that the use of computerized provider order entry (CPOE) can also help to reduce prescription and other errors resulting from the illegible handwriting, we suggest adding generic e-prescribing (eRX) and bar code medication administration (BCMA) as other health IT capabilities that can reduce these errors.

• There are two fallacies in the discussion regarding the lack of interoperability. First, the report attributes this solely to “broad variation in how HIT has been implemented”. Health IT implementation is only one of the barriers to achieving broad interoperability, as has been recognized by the Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT (ONC) in Connecting Health and Care for the Nation: A Shared Nationwide Interoperability Roadmap version 1.0 (Roadmap) [PDF - 3.7 MB]. Second, it is not only user interfaces that lead to inadvertent mistakes, but as described elsewhere in the report, the complex gamut of people, processes, and culture combine to create an environment where errors can occur.

• The report acknowledges that studies of health IT’s impact on patient safety are often narrowly focused. The EHRA agrees and reinforces that there are often multiple participants in an adverse event. Analyses must take a systems view, not focus on a single actor or component of the system.

• On page seven in the “HIT Design” sub-section, we suggest adding the word “may” to the first sentence regarding what is included in the design of health IT.

• In the following paragraph on the same page regarding health IT implementation, the EHRA compliments the NQF HIT Safety Committee report for recognizing the importance of adequate planning, workflow redesign, and staff education/training in the implementation process.

• We disagree that the three-phase framework for the development of EHR-specific patient safety goals on page nine are chronological phases. Implementers could be working in all three “phases” concurrently from the outset – i.e., using health IT to improve quality and safety is something that is expected from the first day of implementation.

• On page 10, in categorizing types of HIT-related safety concerns, the EHRA finds that there is still a narrow focus on system components and single actors, rather than on the broader “cultural” aspects of HIT safety, despite the earlier discussion in the “Role of Human Factors in HIT Safety” sub-section.

• Although we very much respect the work of Drs. Singh and Sittig, we point out that this categorization is still a conceptual model. In an evidence-based learning system, the model must be corroborated by other researchers and implementers and supported by empirical evidence. We do not oppose proceeding based on this as a conceptual model, but future work will need more specificity in defining issues and describing exactly what is being
measured. Most of that work would need to happen later during development of the actual measures.

• We recognize that Table 1 on page eleven is taken largely from the cited works of Drs. Singh and Sittig, but since the report states that the NQF HIT Safety Committee “... determined that a variation of the model ...” is what they would work with, we point out that what Table 1 labels as “levels” should not be considered levels. For instance, “Use of HIT to Improve Patient Safety” is categorized as “Level 3” when it should absolutely be a Level 1 factor. We suggest changing the term “level” to “category”, and thus recognizing that the items in each category are not necessarily dependent on achievement of previous categories.

• In the description of Level 2 in the same table, what is “correct HIT use”? Some health IT features and functions are user-configurable and some are not. “Correct” use may or may not be “as intended”, given varying workflows and preferences among different end-users of the same product. Correctness may be impossible to define or measure.

• In the description of Level 3 in this table, what is “safe ... patient engagement”? This reference was not clear to the EHRA reviewers. We suggest “HIT enables effective patient engagement to enhance safety.” Health IT is the enabler, not the driver; process and culture are the drivers. So, it is health IT in combination with patient engagement that enhances safety.

• On page 13, the report comments that many organizations often do not have the expertise needed to conduct investigation of health IT-related patient safety incidents (e.g., informatics, human factors, ergonomics). We believe that this lack of expertise may not be the largest factor in failure to do proper investigation and analysis. We suggest culture may be at least an equally important factor. We suggest amended language: “However, many organizations have not developed the culture of safety which might be as important as having expertise.”

• Although the nine key measurement areas discussed on pages 15 and 16 seem to be reasonable, we do not necessarily agree with the priority ranking. For example, we believe that high quality documentation should be much higher on the list. The narrative description of how the prioritizations were determined is also a bit perplexing. The report would benefit from a more transparent prioritization process, as well as from a better explanation of how “feasibility” was ascertained. Neither prioritization nor feasibility seems to be quantifiable, replicable, or evidence-based.

• We have several comments on the clinical decision support (CDS) measurement areas section. First, the CDS measure concepts as described will not be easy to measure. Second, the section seems to confuse CDS metrics with alert fatigue metrics, which are not at all the same. The section should be very specific about what is being measured, and the potential measure concepts amended accordingly. Third, while it would be possible to record clinical reaction to active alerts, it would not be possible to record reaction to passive alerts (e.g., flags, highlighted results, bold, underlined, colored text). Creating a way to monitor reactions to passive alerts would introduce major administrative burdens into the clinical workflow for end-users. Fourth, measuring the alert rate would tell us nothing about the importance of the alerts or the effectiveness of the alerts. A greater number of alerts could be either a good thing for safety or a bad thing. Lastly, appropriate alert levels may vary by user role,
clinical setting, or other factors (e.g., ICU, radiology, office visit, home health visit).

• Similar to the CDS section comments, the System Interoperability measure concepts on page seventeen suffer from a lack of real focus and any real specificity about what is to be measured. Also similar to the CDS measures, it is not clear that the results of such measurements will provide actionable information. We are concerned that a lot of effort by health IT developers and end-users would be required with little demonstrable value for the effort. Alternative approaches could measure the volume of data exchanged, or the number of messages the system receives but fail to get delivered to the end-user. The potential measures fail to recognize that data errors may be the cause of non-delivery, not just system/interface errors. We also wonder whether these potential measures are really looking at HIT, or simply looking at a carryover of the paper system’s inability to share information – i.e., is this an HIT problem or a culture/workflow problem? Ultimately, for these measure areas and all the others, this report is simply a conceptual framework. Clearly qualified measure developers would need to do the work to bring each of these concepts from the theoretical stage to where they would be ready for proof-of-concept testing. We suggest that the report more clearly highlight the need for this further work.

• Overall, the EHRA is concerned that the imposition of many of the measurements envisioned by the report will significantly increase the administrative burden on the clinician, leading to frustration, non-participation, and deteriorating usability. We recommend focusing on what data can be captured without imposing data entry by clinicians that is not related to patient care.

• Also in this section, the magnitude of the issues implied by “many EHRs” and “problems often emerge” is not borne out by any of the cited research, and is therefore speculative and misleading. It also fails to differentiate between EHR/HIT-specific issues and system infrastructure, both within an enterprise and across enterprises.

• The EHRA finds the Patient Identification section and associated potential measures fairly well done. The measure concepts are focused and seem to offer actionable information.

• Given the general industry requirements for user-centered design under the ONC meaningful use (MU) certification program, this section (page 20) does not seem to be proposing anything new that would move the usability conversation forward. The potential measure concepts appear to be mostly checklists rather than measurable items.

• The “burdensome data entry requirements” described in the report are frequently the result of compliance requirements, which is not something that user-centered design can mitigate. Those data entry requirements that adversely impact usability stem from many external requirements (e.g., Medicare and Medicaid program rules, MU attestation requirements, ONC certification/audit requirements, state-mandated forms, certification organization documentation requirements). EHRA reviewers struggled with this section in that is does not appear to address any sort of health IT “measurement.” The listed potential measurement concepts simply seem to list the process requirements already codified by ONC, and the standards and related guidance from NIST, ISO, and elsewhere.

• The EHRA finds the System Downtime section on page 23 and associated potential measures fairly well done. The measure concepts are focused and seem to offer actionable information.
• Regarding the Feedback and Information Sharing section on page 25, the EHRA and the developer community place a high value on continuing to enhance our products and averting patient safety problems. The EHR Developer Code of Conduct recognizes the importance of communications of patient safety issues by developers.

• On page 25 and 26, we do have concerns with some of the discussion in the Feedback and Information Sharing section:

  - “Committee members raised concern that some vendor contracts contain broad non-disclosure and confidentiality provisions as well as other intellectual property (IP) protections which prevent certain EHR software information, including screenshots and comparative user experiences, to be publicly shared.” We believe that often this issue is not so much about specific provisions and their terms than how these are applied in practice and especially, the process used by providers and journals to accept product-specific materials. Fundamentally, technology developers have an obligation and need to protect IP and must have processes, including industry-standard contract provisions, to do so.

  - “The Committee believed that such contract terms should not be broader than reasonably necessary to protect the vendor’s legitimate intellectual property interests when balanced against patient safety concerns.” This is a reasonable approach.

  - “The Committee further believed that such provisions are in direct conflict with the goal of sharing patient safety knowledge for quality improvement purposes across settings.” This statement is far too broad in our view.

  - On p. 26 some of the Measure Concepts seem likely to be challenging to measure. In particular, “Software license and hardware purchase agreements permit shared learning of comparative user experiences, timely vendor response to provider requests for information, and use of vendor product information in research studies for peer reviewed journals (e.g. screen shots) and promote shared accountability for HIT safety.” - We do not believe that NQF standards for contract provisions are desirable and feasible and question how such provisions would be evaluated as such a measure was applied and who would evaluate them?

• We recognize that the reports call-out that “meaningful feedback and information sharing” among developers and users is important. However, we believe the term “meaningful” is important, and that the general recommendations in this section of the report ignore that importance. A safety issue that is the result of a particular configuration or interface is not meaningful to any other client without that specific configuration or interface. Hence, the suggestion in the report to make all reported issues publicly available both fails the criterion of “meaningful” and also contributes to additional “alert fatigue” that the CDS section attempts to reduce. We believe, as stated in this report’s Overarching Issue #8, that these frank discussions need to take place in what the recent RTI HIT Safety Report described as a “trusted space” for all. For the most part, that “trusted space” is the Patient Safety Organization (PSO) network of the Agency for Health Research and Quality (AHRQ). The PSO reporting system is evolving, and we agree with this report that the better means of dealing with this type of communication is to further enhance the PSO structure rather than build a duplicative, parallel, and stand-alone structure.
Sub-section seven, Use of HIT to Facilitate Timely and High-Quality Documentation on page 26, seems to be more about how a clinician practices than about health IT. The EHR supports the clinician documenting the clinical encounter. What data that documentation requires is determined not by the HIT, but by the clinical workflow, requirements of the organization, requirements of state and federal government, and requirements of the various third party payers. The potential measurement areas here are only vaguely focused on HIT safety, carrying over from issues in the paper chart, and more about data exchange than documentation. As previously noted, this is perhaps an area that is best addressed by other existing health information exchange initiatives rather than NQF creating a duplicative, parallel process.

With regard to the Patient Engagement section on page 28, the EHRA supports efforts of clinicians to engage patients in managing their healthcare. But, patients interacting directly with their clinicians’ EHRs is not yet a widespread model. Most patient review of EHR data content is via portals, using CCDs or other documents generated by the EHR/HIT. To the extent that patients can point out when something is incorrect, we agree that such patient engagement is a valuable patient safety tool. However, the potential measure concepts here seem more about influencing patient engagement rather than measuring any safety impact on health IT. For instance, the suggested 48- hour response time is arbitrary: 48 hours may be too long for something critical and not at all important for something the clinician and patient deem insignificant (e.g., the scheduling of a 6- month test.) Similarly, we are unclear what is envisioned by 48-hour telemedicine communications. There is no evidence that some minimum number of patient actions improve safety of care. We suggest that evidence needs to be established before constructing such potential measures.

We note that sub-section nine is mostly targeted at providers, not vendors. Nonetheless, we offer a few comments. The EHRA believes the priority for risk management should be higher. We would like to see some incorporation of references to ISO 90001 or similar quality standards. Any health IT risk management system should be integrated into the organization's overall clinical risk management system, not stand-alone.

On page 31, the EHRA concurs with these nine overarching issues. They are important concepts and considerations for how the HIT system works. We point out that while the opening section and the closing section of this report present these issues effectively, they do not appear to be applied to much of the work throughout the body of the report. In much of the report, these overarching issues are set aside, the authors having opted to focus on overly narrow and out-of-context measures.

The EHRA questions the terminology that calls HIT a “medical device.” Health IT shares some aspects in common with a device but, as the report reiterates frequently, HIT is a combination of hardware, software, process, and culture, i.e., a socio-technical construct and not simply a device.

As discussed on page 32, the EHRA concurs with the importance that burden on the end-user of HIT is an important factor in usability and, by extension, safety. We note that the measures discussed in this report must also be held to this same metric: if the end-user burden in increased in order to include a measure, then there must be definitive
evidence that the value of that measure outweighs the increase in end-user burden and the incremental concern with patient safety.

- The EHRA is concerned with the statement that HIT-related measures may not necessarily meet NQF requirements for importance, scientific acceptability, usability and feasibility (page 33). We stress that any measurement developed must be well-defined, actually what is intended to be measured, and that the measurement provide meaningful knowledge to the healthcare learning system.

EHRA commends NQF on its effort to compile this report. We hope it will move the discussion further toward a ubiquitous culture of safety within a national learning system. While there is much good thought in the report, we believe it would benefit from significant editing to ensure that all of the sections of the report take into consideration the nine overarching Issues. We believe that many of the potential measure areas have strayed well outside of the stated intent of the report, namely to identify and prioritize health IT patient safety measures. In our opinion, many of the potential measurement areas seek to address policy issues rather than health IT safety metrics. We point out that many of the potential measure areas imply additional data entry burden for providers, which would exacerbate what the report acknowledges as already too much of a burden on clinicians. This must be reconciled.

Finally, we note that the potential measurement areas are conceptual. It will require considerable work by qualified measure developers to undertake the task of bringing them from concept to the bit-and-byte level. This will need to include precise definitions and clear evidence that the effort to develop and implement the measures will produce the value to make that investment worthwhile.

The EHRA and its Patient Safety Workgroup appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report. We also extend an open invitation to provide additional feedback to NQF, engaging other stakeholders as appropriate.

Sincerely,

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